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Constitutional Constraints 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.† 
It seems natural to assume that a central function of the Constitution is to 
constrain officials.
1 It seems almost equally natural, however, to question 
whether reality matches that assumption. The impetus for doubt comes from 
observing Supreme Court justices, judges, and other officials when they 
confront constitutional issues. 
Skeptics have long questioned whether and to what extent the Constitution 
constrains Supreme Court justices. Charles Evans Hughes, who would later 
serve as chief justice of the United States, signaled the ground for concern 
when he remarked that “the Constitution is what the judges say it is.”
2 Today as 
much as in Hughes’s time, justices who are believed to hold substantively 
conservative views tend to reach judgments that political conservatives 
applaud. Correspondingly, justices who are perceived as liberal routinely come 
to conclusions that liberals favor. Occasionally a justice bemoans that he or she 
dislikes some result that the Constitution requires,
3 but such protests rarely 
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1. Cf.  Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint 241 (1995) (“Liberal 
constitutions . . . are designed . . . to force officeholders . . . to act against their own immediate 
interests in order to promote the general interest.”). 
2. Charles Evans Hughes, Speech Before the Elmira Chamber of Commerce (May 3, 
1907), in Addresses of Charles Evan Hughes, 1906–1916, at 185 (2d ed. 1916). 
3. For example, Justice John Paul Stevens has described his own majority opinions in Kelo 
v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), as 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
976  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:975 
occur. Indeed, political scientists employing a so-called “attitudinal model” 
have achieved notable success in predicting the justices’ votes based solely on 
whether newspaper editorials classified them as “liberal” or “conservative” at 
the time of their nominations.
4 
Questions about the Constitution’s constraining effect on the executive 
branch may seem equally apt. In recent years, the Bush administration claimed 
nearly unlimited executive power to address perceived threats to national 
security, duly enacted legislation to the contrary notwithstanding.
5 Often acting 
in secret and on the basis of legal opinions authored by hand-picked 
subordinates, high-ranking officials reportedly engaged in practices forbidden 
by previous understandings of the separation of powers and, according to one 
source, “sanctioned coerced confessions, extrajudicial detention, and other 
violations of individuals’ liberties that had been prohibited since the country’s 
founding.”
6 In the view of these officials, the Constitution’s grant of executive 
power functions as a highly potent authorization to combat alleged threats 
unilaterally, but it imposes little or no constraint on the president, at least in the 
domain of national security. 
One might also wonder how much, if at all, the Constitution constrains 
members of Congress. To take just one example, in the recurring debate about 
campaign finance reform, legislators who believe that restrictions would 
improve the political process invariably maintain that the Constitution permits 
their preferred initiatives.
7 Conversely, opponents protest that in addition to 
embodying unwise policies, reform bills would violate the First Amendment.
8 
 
reaching “unwise” conclusions, but explained that “in each I was convinced that the law 
compelled a result that I would have opposed if I were a legislator.” Linda Greenhouse, Justice 
Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty Prevails),  N.Y. Times, Aug. 25, 2005, at A1 (quoting remarks 
delivered by Justice Stevens at a bar association meeting). See also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. 
López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 801 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (writing separately “to 
emphasize the distinction between constitutionality and wise policy”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing a law prohibiting the use of 
contraceptives as “uncommonly silly” and disagreeing with the prohibition on philosophical and 
social policy grounds, but refusing to declare the law unconstitutional). 
4. See  Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the 
Attitudinal Model 228 (1993) [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model]; see also 
Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557 (1989). 
5. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency: Law and Judgment Inside the 
Bush Administration 85–90 (2007); Jane Mayer, The Dark Side 45–46, 268, 328 (2008); 
Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency and the Subversion 
of American Democracy (2007); John Yoo, War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account 
of the War on Terror 102–04, 113, 168–87 (2006); Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the 
Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69 Ohio St. L. 
J. 391, 391–92 (2008). 
6. Mayer, supra note 5, at 328. 
7. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendants, McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (No. 
02-1674). 
8. For example, Senator Mitch McConnell, who was a leading Senate opponent of 
campaign finance reform, swiftly became the named plaintiff in McConnell, the leading case 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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When policy preferences align so regularly with judgments of constitutional 
permissibility, questions naturally arise about whether the Constitution 
genuinely constrains legislators’ policymaking. 
Although issues involving constitutional constraints are both important 
and timely, the general topic of the existence, nature, and efficacy of 
constitutional constraints has received little systematic exploration by legal 
scholars.
9 M o s t  o f  t h e  b e s t  w o r k  i n  A m e r ican constitutional theory is 
normative, focused on questions of how Supreme Court justices ought to decide 
contested cases.
10 Given their normative orientation, constitutional theorists 
typically assume that judges are motivated to do their constitutional duties, 
even if they are currently mistaken about the interpretive methodology that they 
ought to use. Such theorists pay little attention to non-normative constraints on 
judicial action.
11 
By contrast, political scientists concern themselves more frequently with 
constraints, especially as perceived by officials whom they assume to be 
rational maximizers of their personal, typically ideological, preferences.
12 
Strategic actor models of official behavior are highly illuminating in identifying 
the challenges that frequently confront officials (including judges) who 
understand that the effects of actions that they might take—however 
motivated—will depend on the responses of others. But work that models 
public officials as strategic actors almost necessarily highlights the 
motivational force of ideology and self-interest. Such work seldom probes the 
ways in which legal norms may shape officials’ goals and thereby constrain 
their behavior.
13 In addition, theories that portray judges, in particular, as 
 
challenging the Act’s constitutionality in the Supreme Court. 
 9. An important recent exception to this generalization is Richard A. Posner, How 
Judges Think (2008), which includes chapters on both internal and external constraints on 
judicial decision making. 
10. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 257, 257 
(2005) (“In the legal academy, scholarship about judicial review is predominantly normative. It is 
largely about how judges should decide cases and what posture they ought to take toward the 
work of other institutions.”) (footnotes omitted). 
11. For explorations of the possible ways normative theorists might use positive 
constitutional theory, see Adrian Vermeule, Connecting Positive and Normative Legal Theory, 10 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 387 (2008); Friedman, supra note 10. 
12. Indeed, John Ferejohn, Positive Theory and the Internal View of Law, 10 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 273, 280 (2008), treats as a necessary element of a “positive theory” that it include a 
description of “the institutional, physical, and fiscal constraints” of relevant actors, along with 
“the preferences of the agents, the sets of actions each can take  .  .  . and a description of the 
outcomes that arise as a function of the actions taken by the agents.” For some examples of 
political science scholarship viewing judges as rational maximizers operating subject to 
constraints, see Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make 9–10 (1998); 
McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law, 
68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1631 (1995). 
13. Cf. Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution 376 (2000) (acknowledging 
that from an economic perspective, “an internal obligation [is] a preference,” but acknowledging 
that “[f]rom a psychological viewpoint . . . respect for the law does not feel like a preference for 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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constrained strategic decision-makers have often taken a backseat in the law 
reviews to “attitudinalist” literature
14 that assumes Supreme Court justices are 
single-minded maximizers of their political preferences who face few, if any, 
constraints in voting to advance their ideologies.
15 Political scientific studies 
that attempt to account for judges and justices being motivated by a sense of 
legal obligation, including scholarship from a “new institutionalist” school,
16 
have not yet attracted the attention in legal scholarship that they deserve. 
If any field of legal study has paid close attention to the respective 
significances of normative and non-normative constraints, it is jurisprudence. 
In jurisprudence, the roles of threats, sanctions, and norms in constituting and 
sustaining legal regimes often lie at the center of inquiry.
17 For the most part, 
however, jurisprudential scholarship tends to be general and abstract, focused 
 
asparagus or waterskiing”); Ferejohn, supra note 12, at 275 (“[M]ore common forms of positive 
theory take preferences and constraints to be determined by factors external to the legal system.”). 
14. For well-known statements of this “attitudinal model,” see Segal & Spaeth, 
Attitudinal Model, supra note 4; Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme 
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (2002)  [hereinafter Segal & Spaeth, 
Attitudinal Model Revisited]; Harold J. Spaeth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Majority Rule or 
Minority Will: Adherence to Precedent on the U.S. Supreme Court (1999) [hereinafter 
Spaeth & Segal, Adherence to Precedent]. 
15. See Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model, supra note 4, at 360 (asserting that the 
influence of non-attitudinal factors appears to be “overwhelmingly insubstantial”). Although the 
attitudinal model has attracted increasing criticism, many of the most telling political scientific 
critiques—which identify constraints to which judges and justices must respond “strategically” 
(rather than always voting in straightforward accord with their ideologies)—share the 
attitudinalists’ assumption that legal decision-makers experience no normative constraints arising 
from legal obligations to obey the Constitution. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as 
a  Strategic  National Policymaker, 50 Emory L.J. 583, 592 (2001) (proposing a “strategic 
approach” that “starts off with” the attitudinalist premise that justices are “‘single-minded seekers 
of legal policy’” but assumes that they must behave strategically in order to advance their policy 
goals effectively). 
16. A number of political scientists, especially those described as “new institutionalists,” 
acknowledge and indeed emphasize the significance of felt normative obligations—many if not 
most of which arise from a sense of institutional role—as an important consideration motivating 
judicial decisions. See, e.g, Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the “New Institutionalism,” 
and the Future of Public Law, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (1988); Howard Gillman, What’s Law 
Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 
26  Law & Soc. Inquiry 465, 486 (2001) (reviewing Spaeth & Segal, Adherance to 
Precedent, supra note 14); Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist 
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 601 (2000) (reviewing Supreme Court 
Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard 
Gillman eds., 1999) and The Supreme Court in American Politics: New Institutionalist 
Interpretations (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds.,  1999));  see also Stefanie A. 
Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 Law & Soc’y Rev. 135, 156 (2006) (concluding 
that an empirical study of the Supreme Court’s cases involving issues that have divided the federal 
courts of appeals “strongly support[s] the view that judges and justices engage in sincere efforts to 
find solutions that are persuasive according to a commonly held set of criteria”). For introductions 
to new institutionalist scholarship, see, for example, Supreme Court Decision-Making, supra; 
The Supreme Court in American Politics, supra. 
17. See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 18–99 (2d ed. 1994). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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on what H.L.A. Hart referred to as “the concept of law.”
18 Jurisprudential 
writers seldom turn their attention to distinctively constitutional constraints or 
to the institutional settings of particular officials in particular legal systems. 
My principal goal in this Article is to open up the subject of constitutional 
constraints as a topic for inquiry in American constitutional theory. 
Specifically, I mean to frame—and then to make some initial progress toward 
answering—the questions whether, how, and to what extent the Constitution 
constrains official decision-makers. 
In pursuing that inquiry, I begin in a loosely philosophical vein by 
critically examining, in Part I, the ideas of constitutional constraint and non-
constraint. Upon analysis, the thought that officials holding constitutionally 
constituted offices might be wholly unconstrained by the Constitution proves 
incoherent. To be a president or a member of Congress or a justice of the 
Supreme Court is to serve in an institution that is constituted and empowered 
by the Constitution and, as a result, necessarily constrained by it.
19 As both a 
conceptual and a practical matter, the alternative to constrained presidents, 
congressmen, and justices is not unconstrained officials, but rather no 
presidents, congressmen, or justices at all. In short, to be an official in our 
constitutional regime is to be constrained by both the Constitution and the legal 
institutions that the Constitution establishes or supports.
20 The most important 
question is not whether the Constitution constrains, but how. 
To begin to answer that question, Part II develops a typology of 
constitutional constraints. In so doing, Part II adopts a conceptual approach 
suggested by The Federalist 51,
21 which discusses the need to supplement 
defects in officials’ norm-based commitments to do what they ought to do with 
constraints arising from checks imposed by others.
22 The former I characterize 
as “normative constraints,” and the latter as “external constraints.”
23 In 
 
18. See id. (emphasis added). 
19. See  Holmes,  supra note 1, at 163 (noting that the Constitution simultaneously 
constrains and empowers those holding offices that it helps create). 
20. Although I refer separately here to “the Constitution and the legal institutions that the 
Constitution establishes or supports,” I shall often use the term “the Constitution” in a capacious 
sense that subsumes or incorporates institutions—for example, courts and the President—that are 
established by or draw their legitimacy from that written text. As I shall explain in slightly more 
detail below, see infra notes 60–82 and accompanying text, because the written Constitution can 
constrain only insofar as it is accepted and put into practice, it is hard, if not impossible, to make 
sense of the idea that the Constitution is capable of “constraining” in the absence of institutions 
that reflect or even embody the written Constitution’s acceptance. 
21. The Federalist No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
22. See id. at 320–23. 
23. I use the term “external constraints” more broadly than Madison did. Madison 
contrasted “internal” constraints, which were those established and enforced within the federal 
government, typically by one branch against another, with “external” constraints, which originated 
outside the federal government’s tripartite structure. See id. at 320–23. As I explain more fully 
below, I use the term “external constraint” to embrace both of Madison’s categories of the internal 
and the external. For my purposes, the pertinent contrast is between constraints rooted in norms 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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elucidating the idea of normative constraints, Part II draws on jurisprudential 
scholarship, especially that which H.L.A. Hart produced and inspired,
24 which 
emphasizes that foundational legal rules can be seen from either an “internal” 
or an “external” point of view.
25 As portrayed by Hart, the internal point of 
view is that of someone who “accepts” legal rules, such as those embodied in 
the Constitution, as providing her with reasons for action.
26 The external point 
of view, on the other hand, is that of someone who may not regard legal rules 
as normatively authoritative for her, but who wishes to understand the thinking 
of those who do, often to predict the consequences of noncompliance.
27 
Viewed from an internal perspective, the Constitution furnishes standards 
of legally required and forbidden conduct that guide at least some officials’ 
judgments that they have obligations trumping or displacing what they 
otherwise might wish to do. Insofar as officials regard the Constitution from an 
internal point of view, they will be constrained by constitutional norms or be 
subject to normative constraints.
28 In its logically primary usage, the notion of 
normative constraints refers to legal rules or norms that exist independently of 
the mind of any particular official.
29 Although a legal system cannot exist 
without broadly shared agreement about how to differentiate law from non-
law,
30 individual officials can sometimes be mistaken about what the law 
permits or requires them to do. For example, a conscientious official might 
believe the Constitution authorizes the executive branch to employ brutal 
interrogation methods that the courts would rightly construe the Constitution to 
forbid. In other cases, officials may think they have constitutional duties, when 
in fact they do not.
31 
 
(“normative constraints”), on the one hand, and those rooted in concerns about adverse 
consequences (“external constraints”), on the other. 
24. Hart, supra note 17. 
25. See id. at 55–56, 86–89. 
26. See id. at 11 (explaining that to accept a social rule is to treat the rule as a “reason and 
justification” for action); see also id. at 90 (explaining that a social rule can form the “basis for 
claims, demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment”). For lucid and sympathetic commentary 
on the Hartian idea of an internal point of view, see Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of 
View?, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1157 (2006). 
27. See Hart, supra note 17, at 87. 
28. See generally The Oxford Companion to Philosophy 626 (Ted Honderich ed., 
1995) (characterizing a norm as an action-guiding or reason-giving precept or principle, deviation 
from which would provide a ground for reproach within an appropriate domain such as that of 
morals, law, or etiquette). 
29. Cf. Dale Smith, Ronald Dworkin and the External Skeptic, 19 Can. J.L. & Juris. 433, 
433–34 (2006) (discussing “mind-independence” of norms). 
30. See John R. Searle, The Construction of a Social Reality (1995) [hereinafter 
Searle, Construction]. 
31. In so asserting, I obviously assume that some constitutional questions have correct 
answers. The jurisprudential question of what makes a legal answer correct has occasioned the 
spilling of much ink, see, e.g., Hart, supra note 17, and this is surely not the occasion for me to 
attempt to contribute to, or even to summarize, the relevant literature. I assume, however, that in 
the myriad of “easy” cases, most of which never get litigated because the Constitution’s meaning 
and application are too obvious to trigger dispute—see infra notes 67–76 and accompanying 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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In another usage, however, normative constitutional constraints take the 
form of constitutionally inspired experiences of obligation, for it is only as 
refracted through individual minds and consciences that legal norms can be 
motivationally efficacious.
32 As this usage may suggest, psychological 
apprehensions of constitutional obligation can exist even in cases of reasonable 
disagreement about what the Constitution requires
33 and, perhaps more 
jarringly, even when an official is mistaken about the Constitution’s dictates.
34 
At this preliminary stage, one last point about normative constraints 
should be introduced. In speaking of normative constraints, I assume that at 
least some officials are sometimes motivated to act out of a sense of 
constitutional obligation, even when their rational self-interest or political 
values would otherwise lead them to act differently. Norm-skeptics, who 
believe that people are irreducibly self-interested, of course reject this 
assumption.
35 In their eyes, every example adduced to show that someone acted 
 
text—all of the leading theories will converge in their acknowledgment of what the correct answer 
is, even if they provide divergent explanations as to why. In “hard” cases in which legally 
knowledgeable parties reasonably disagree about what the Constitution requires, I believe that a 
tacitly recognized rule of constitutional practice, grounded in acceptance, see infra notes 60–82 
and accompanying text, confers upon judges and justices a power to make determinations of what 
would be legally “best” in a sense that depends partly on moral or policy judgments. See infra 
notes 135–137 and accompanying text; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Precedent-Based 
Adjudication, Acceptance, and the Rule of Recognition, in Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth 
Einar Himma, The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 47, 59–60 (forthcoming 
2009 from Oxford University Press) (developing this argument). Although judgments concerning 
the legally best answers in hard cases may be controversial, I follow Professor Dworkin in 
assuming that acknowledgment of controversy should not disable judgments of correctness in 
constitutional law any more than it does in morals. See Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe It, 25 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 87 (1996). 
32. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Has Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme 
Court?, 24 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 381, 391–96 (2007) (examining the role of the “felt obligation” to 
follow precedent in the Supreme Court). 
33. See, e.g., Dan Simon, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look Through the 
Lens of Cognitive Psychology, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 1097, 1129 (2002) (advancing a cognitive 
psychological account of “the discrepancy between the openness that is apparent in the legal 
materials and the judicial claim of being constrained by them”). 
34. Because the psychological sense of constraint can sometimes diverge from the social 
fact-based norms in which it is rooted, and because reasonable disagreement about the content of 
those norms sometimes exists, it is entirely imaginable that one justice of the Supreme Court 
might feel normatively obliged to uphold a claimed constitutional right that another justice would 
feel normatively constrained to reject. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) 
(explaining how theoretical disagreement in law is consistent with the view that legal questions 
have one right answer); Wayne D. Moore, Reconceiving Interpretive Autonomy: Insights from the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 11 Const. Comment. 315, 345 (1994) (arguing that “the rule 
of law is promoted by the Constitution’s being flexible enough to allow different persons . . . to 
act based on diverging interpretive positions”); Simon, supra note 33, at 1112, 1129 (explaining 
how judges can feel constrained to adopt a particular interpretation even when the legal materials 
manifestly permit different interpretations). 
35. In philosophy, such norm-skepticism is sometimes called “psychological egoism.” See, 
e.g., Joel Feinberg, Psychological Egoism, in Reason and Responsibility 497, 497 (9th ed. 
1996) (“[A]ll human actions when properly understood can be seen to be motivated by selfish 
desires.”); Michael Anthony Slote, An Empirical Basis for Psychological Egoism, 61 J. Phil. 530 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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contrary to self-interest only proves that she must have thought, given her tastes 
and preferences, that it actually was in her self-interest to act as she did.
36 
Despite the difficulty of offering proofs that would satisfy a deep skeptic 
that human behavior is not always self-interested, the evidence of people being 
motivated by norms, including legal norms, seems too pervasive for the norm-
skeptic’s challenge to arouse much concern. As Jon Elster has pointed out, the 
practice of explaining behavior by appeal to norms would presumably cease if 
people, based on their own experiences, did not find norm-based accounts 
credible.
37 Furthermore, it is easy to cite examples that give every outward 
appearance of being norm-based behavior in the constitutional domain. As 
insider accounts of the Bush administration have made clear, some officials 
risked and lost their jobs for refusing to give the legal and constitutional advice 
that other, higher officials hoped to get.
38 Congressional history includes 
notable “profiles in courage” by members who hazarded their political careers 
in order to perform their duties as they perceived them.
39 More mundanely, the 
alignments of Supreme Court justices in a number of demonstrably contestable 
cases—with both conservatives and liberals sometimes dividing 
unpredictably—belie suggestions that the justices always merely vote their 
political preferences, rather than responding to a sense of constitutional 
obligation.
40 
As Madison explained in The Federalist 51, however, it surely would be a 
mistake to assume that the Constitution is enforced—or that officials are 
constrained—by normative constraints alone. Rather, the Constitution creates 
institutions—including the electorate—that are empowered to establish non-
normative or “external” constraints on official action. Madison had what I call 
 
(1964). Norm skepticism also emerges in certain theories of cultural evolution. See, e.g., Richard 
Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (1st ed. 1976). The most prominent analogs in legal scholarship 
emerge in law and economics—which tends to explain human behavior and evaluate legal 
interventions solely in terms of self-interest and welfare effects—but sophisticated accounts rely 
only on the predictiveness of self-interest, not on any deep, psychological claim about human 
motivation. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50  Stan. L. Rev. 1551, 1558–67 (1998) (discussing possible role for norms of fairness in 
economic theory); Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life 1 (Univ. of Chi. John M. 
Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 12 (2d series), 1993), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_01-25/12.Becker.Econ.pdf (describing 
economics as “a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations”). 
36. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Psychological Egoism, in Ethical Theory 183, 183 (Russ 
Shafer-Landau ed., 2007) (“In short, purely altruistic and benevolent actions and desires do not 
exist; but people sometimes appear to be acting unselfishly and disinterestedly when they take the 
interests of others to be means to the promotion of their own self-interest.”). 
37. See Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic Theory, 3 J. Econ. Persp. 99, 103–04 
(1989). 
38. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 10–11; Mayer, supra note 5, at 308. 
39. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (1st ed. 1956). 
40. See Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court Invalidate 
Federal Statutes?, 101 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 321, 336 (2007). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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“external constraints” in mind
41 when he said that “ambition must be made to 
counter ambition” and praised the strategy of “divid[ing] and arrang[ing] the 
several offices in such a manner that each may be a check on the other.”
42 
Unlike normative constraints, external constraints do not function by 
inspiring officials with a sense of legal or moral obligation. Instead, external 
constraints inhere in the unwanted consequences that failure to comply with the 
law, or at least with expectations that are traceable to the Constitution, would 
frequently engender.
43 In some cases, officials may be externally constrained to 
obey by the threat of sanctions. In others, officials may be externally 
constrained because they know that failure to comply with legal requirements 
for the valid exercise of their power would result in their acts being treated as 
legal nullities. 
In the constitutional system as imagined by Madison, the distinction 
between normative and external constraints was in theory dramatically stark. 
When one official or branch of government checked or constrained another, 
Madison imagined that the checking institution, as much as the one attempting 
to overreach its constitutional powers, might be motivated by “private interest” 
rather than a sense of constitutional duty.
44 Among the puzzles generated by his 
account, Madison never adequately explained how a continuing competition 
among purely selfish interests could be expected to produce adherence to 
constitutional norms.
45 In arguing that it would, Madison apparently relied on 
the assumption that the interests of officials in the different branches would 
align with their branches’ long-term interest in maintaining at least as much 
power as the Constitution gave them. But there is little reason to assume that 
otherwise wholly self-interested officials would identify their private interests 
with the long-term interests of a particular branch of government—rather than 
promoting or acquiescing in whatever distribution of power would best 
promote their ideological or electoral interests at any particular time.
46 For 
example, a purely self-interested senator could be expected to acquiesce in 
 
41. He used the term somewhat differently, however. See supra note 23. 
42. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 21, at 322. 
43. External constraints are the sole focus of those who deploy rational choice or economic 
analysis. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs 
and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers,  Law & 
Contemp. Probs., Autumn 1993, at 293, 295–305. For pioneering explorations of how strategic 
or game theoretical assumptions regarding human motivation might be incorporated into a 
basically Hartian framework, see Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Principle 92–95 (2001); 
Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. Legal Stud. 
165, 182–97 (1982). For an interesting discussion suggesting that positive political scientists 
should have a place for the internal point of view in their theories, see Ferejohn, supra note 12. 
44. Id. 
45. See Adrian Vermeule, Systemic Effects and the Second-Best Constitution (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the author; forthcoming 2009 in the Harvard Law Review). 
46. See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 Harv. L. 
Rev. 915 (2005) (critiquing the assumption that government officials characteristically wish to 
expand the authority of the institutions of government in which they serve). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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assertions of executive power whenever she was in ideological sympathy with 
the executive branch and in assertions of judicial power that advanced her 
political agenda. 
If the Madisonian system works even approximately as Madison expected, 
it must be because some officials, some or even most of the time, adopt an 
internal point of view on constitutional norms in determining when to check the 
attempted actions of other officials or other branches of government. For the 
reasons that I gave above in defending the idea that officials can and do engage 
in norm-based behavior that is otherwise contrary to their self-interest,
47 I 
assume in this Article that internal and external constraints on official action 
will typically align with and reinforce one another in ways that I shall try to 
explain. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that normative and external 
constraints theoretically could, and sometimes may, conflict or compete with 
one another. Conflict can occur if an institution that is constitutionally 
empowered to enforce constitutional norms instead uses its sanctioning powers 
for selfish, partisan, or otherwise unconstitutional purposes. In addition, even 
when constitutionally empowered actors proceed in good faith, they may err in 
their constitutional judgments. In cases in which institutions empowered to 
enforce constitutional norms either ignore their constitutional duties or act in 
error, an official may be externally constrained by the prospect of being 
sanctioned for actually adhering to constitutional norms. 
Consider, for example, the situation of a state court judge who expects to 
be voted out of office if she enforces unpopular constitutional norms, or an 
executive official who would be sanctioned by her superiors if she did not 
engage in constitutionally forbidden interrogation techniques. In these cases, it 
is tempting to say that the external constraints confronting the official—the 
anticipated, unwanted consequences that may ultimately play a large role in 
determining her behavior—are not genuinely constitutional constraints because 
they do not accurately reflect constitutional norms. But if the answer to the 
question “How does the Constitution constrain?” is to refer to the 
Constitution’s empowerment of officials and institutions with the capacity to 
visit unwanted consequences on officials who are perceived to have violated 
constitutional norms, then it must be recognized that the Constitution’s 
deliberately selected constraining mechanisms will, inevitably, misfire from 
time to time. Whoever the ultimate enforcer is, the ultimate enforcer may err. 
As Justice Robert Jackson famously said of the Supreme Court, “We are not 
final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.”
48 
A central assumption of this Article is that insofar as the Constitution 
 
47. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
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gives rise to expectations about how officials can acceptably behave, and 
insofar as it creates or supports institutions capable of visiting adverse 
consequences on officials who do not comply with their perceived duties or 
otherwise depart from accepted patterns of behavior, the resulting constraints 
on official action ought to count as “constitutional constraints.” In other words, 
the Constitution performs part of its constraining function by constituting, 
empowering, and supporting a network of mutually reinforcing institutions with 
the capacity to visit unwanted consequences on officials who would otherwise 
not comply with constitutional norms. 
When the basic distinction between normative and external constraints is 
drawn, subcategories of both can be distinguished, and their interactions can be 
traced. Among the reasons that normative theorists should pay attention to 
external constraints is that, as Part II begins to explain, external constraints may 
play important roles not only in determining some officials’ behavior, but also 
in shaping those officials’ understandings of what they are normatively 
constrained to do and not to do. 
Part III of this Article deploys the conceptual apparatus developed in Part 
II to examine constitutional constraints on judges and especially Supreme Court 
justices. Part IV then addresses the nature and bite of the constitutional 
restraints confronting nonjudicial officials. 
Contrasting the constitutional constraints on the judiciary with those on 
nonjudicial officials reveals interesting asymmetries. Perhaps the most striking 
is that the widely recognized authority of the Supreme Court definitively “to 
say what the law is”
49 means that most officials are constrained to follow the 
Court’s directives, even when they believe that the Court has erred, while the 
Court is not symmetrically constrained. On the surface, this asymmetry might 
suggest a constitutional preference for government by judiciary.
50 At a deeper 
level, however, it reveals a more substantive premise, rooted in the 
Constitution, that helps explain a good deal about the overall structure of 
constitutional constraints: the Constitution embodies the assumption, whether 
right or wrong, that presidential and legislative action is more dangerous than 
presidential and legislative inaction and, accordingly, that presidential and 
congressional action should be subject to an especially dense network of 
constitutional constraints. 
Before proceeding further, I should acknowledge a limitation on the scope 
of my inquiry that may disappoint some readers. In this Article, I offer a 
conceptual mapping of different kinds of normative and external constraints, 
and advance some non-quantitative hypotheses about how they interact with 
one another, but I make no effort to assess their absolute or relative significance 
 
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
50. For a brief introduction to the idea of government by judiciary, see Frederick Schauer, 
The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, Foreword: The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 Harv. L. 
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in motivating particular officials. To do so would require empirical studies that 
lie far beyond my ambition in this Article. It will be more than enough if this 
Article provokes others to explore the relations between normative and non-
normative constraints on official action in constituting and sustaining the 
American constitutional order. 
I 
CONSTITUTION AND CONTEXT: ESTABLISHING THE LIMITS OF THE INQUIRY 
In order to think about how and to what extent the Constitution constrains 
official behavior, it is necessary to consider the relationship between 
constitutional rules, on the one hand, and officials’ goals and motivations, on 
the other hand.
51 Officials undoubtedly have some goals that are largely 
independent of or exogenous to the constitutional structure. Fame and wealth 
occupy this category. Many, including some judges, may also have political or 
ideological agendas.
52 Some may prefer to avoid arduous work or the obloquy 
that comes with taking positions different from those of their families, parties, 
friends, or co-religionists. With officials having goals such as these, we can 
think of many constitutional rules as seeking to regulate or constrain officials’ 
pursuit of their personal satisfaction. 
We will go wrong at the outset, however, if we imagine that the 
Constitution characteristically or most fundamentally constrains officials in the 
same way that regulative rules such as prohibitions against murder constrain 
those who would otherwise commit homicides. In the absence of laws 
forbidding murder, people would presumably have the same power to threaten 
others that they have now, but they would be less constrained from taking 
deadly actions because of the lack of legal consequences. By contrast, in the 
absence of constitutional constraints on presidents and Supreme Court justices, 
we would not have constitutionally unconstrained presidents and Supreme 
Court justices. Instead, we would have no officials corresponding to what we 
today call presidents and Supreme Court justices.
53 
 
51. For prominent discussions of this topic, see, for example, Lawrence Baum, Judges 
and Their Audiences 10–14 (2006); Epstein & Knight, supra note 12; Richard A. Posner, 
Overcoming Law 135–44 (1995); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? 
(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993). 
52. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 15, at 592 n.27 (noting that “[m]any strategic accounts of 
judicial decisions” make this assumption). 
53. Philosophers sometimes distinguish between “constitutive rules,” which “create or 
define new forms of behavior,” and “regulative rules,” which “regulate a pre-existing activity, an 
activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules.” John R. Searle, Speech Acts 
33–34 (1969) [hereinafter Searle, Speech Acts].  See, e.g.,  Anthony Giddens,  The 
Constitution of Society 18 (1984); Searle, Construction,  supra note 30; Christopher 
Cherry, Regulative Rules and Constitutive Rules, 23 Phil. Q. 301 (1973). For criticism of the 
view that regulative and constitutive rules are truly distinct, see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason 
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A. The Conceptual Link Among Constraint, Constitution, and Empowerment 
The Constitution constrains officials most fundamentally and pervasively 
by helping create the context—including the official roles or offices—in which 
questions of constitutional constraint and even some questions of official 
motivation arise.
54 The president cannot enact laws and the courts cannot 
establish national economic or defense policies. If we ask why, the answer is 
that to be a judge or a president is to have certain recognized and lawful 
powers, but not others. By constituting the offices of president and Supreme 
Court justice, for example, the Constitution helps establish widely accepted 
understandings of what presidents and justices can (and cannot) lawfully do. 
These understandings then function as constraints. Many, if not most, 
attempted exercises of purported powers that have not actually been conferred, 
if even thinkable, would be treated as nullities at best and might in some cases 
trigger the imposition of sanctions—matters that I discuss at length below. 
An analogy may drive home the point. Asking whether the Constitution 
constrains judges or presidents is like asking whether the rules of baseball 
constrain a batter from running directly to second base before going to first. 
Although the answer in one sense may be yes, the most fundamental function 
of the rules of baseball is to constitute the game. Once those rules are in place, 
they can constrain behavior in one sense, but constraint of players and 
constitution of the game are too closely bound up for the question whether the 
rules constrain to be independent of questions involving what those rules 
authorize players to do and what goals they countenance.
55 Because the 
 
54. On the constitutive function of constitutions, see, for example, Holmes, supra note 1, 
at 163; Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408 (2007). 
Andrei Marmor, Legal Conventionalism, 4 Legal Theory 509 (1998), similarly argues that the 
jurisprudential concept of a “rule of recognition,” which I discuss at infra notes 63–82 and 
accompanying text, should be regarded as a “constitutive convention.” 
55. See Searle, Speech Acts, supra note 53, at 33–34 (“The rules of football or chess, for 
example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create the very 
possibility of playing such games. The activities of playing football or chess are constituted by 
acting in accordance with (at least a large subset of) the appropriate rules.”); W. Bradley Wendel, 
Lawyers, Citizens, and the Internal Point of View, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1473, 1485 (2006) 
(“Actually participating in a meaningful, purposive social practice, as opposed to dressing up and 
pretending to participate in it, requires accepting as mandatory the standards that regulate the 
practice.”). 
In a recent book, Judge Posner frequently refers to “rules” of law and of judging, but notes 
that whereas “[i]f you do not play chess by the rules, you are not doing anything,” the situation is 
different with respect to judging: “If you do not play judging by the rules, but instead act like a 
politician in robes, you are doing something, and it may be something you value more than you do 
the game of judging as it is supposed to be played.” Posner, supra note 9, at 91. Although there is 
something to this contrast, it is not as stark as Judge Posner maintains. On the one hand, someone 
may cheat at chess (or any other game) in order to win, and by earning recognition, the victor is 
doing something, not nothing. On the other hand, a judge who did something that was clearly ultra 
vires—for example, ordering the Internal Revenue Service to withdraw a tax assessment against 
her or directing the Federal Reserve Board to lower interest rates—would not be viewed as having 
acted with the authority of law and, in that sense, would have done “nothing” within “the game of 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Constitution helps constitute the institutional and cultural framework in which 
judges and presidents experience both power and constraint, there is no 
independent baseline of non-constraint from which to measure the 
constitutional constraints on judges or presidents.
56 
The matrix of constitutionally established roles not only shapes and limits 
what officials can do, but presumably also influences what they want to do.
57 
Imagine a person who aspires to be president or a Supreme Court justice. These 
goals are obviously not unrelated to interests in fame, power, and political 
ideology. But a person who wants to be president or a Supreme Court justice 
will probably not seek that office merely as a means to achieve fame or power 
or to advance her ideology. Much more likely, she will want to occupy that 
position, defined as it is, with the opportunities to achieve fame or power or 
advance her ideology that it affords.
58 
To summarize: we cannot answer the questions whether and how the 
Constitution constrains officials without simultaneously inquiring how and to 
what extent the Constitution both empowers officials and helps to define 
plausible goals. To think lucidly about how the Constitution constrains public 
officials such as judges and presidents, we must constantly keep in mind that 
the Constitution not only constitutes the offices of judge and president, but also 
lies at the foundation of an interlocking network of roles and role-based 
 
judging.” Id. 
56. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 163 (observing that “constitutional rules are enabling, not 
disabling”). 
57. See  Posner,  supra note 9, at 45 (“Lower-court judges follow Supreme Court 
precedent . . . because . . . adhering to precedents created by a higher court is one of the rules of 
the judicial ‘game’ that judges internalize.”); Whittington, supra note 16, at 615 (“Institutions do 
not merely impose constraints on choices; they constitute preferences.”); Stephen Skowrenek, 
Order and Change, 28 Polity 91, 94 (1995) (observing that “institutions do not simply constrain 
or channel the actions of self-interested individuals, they prescribe actions, construct motives, and 
assert legitimacy”). For a review of some of the positions in the psychological literature seeking to 
explain how roles influence behavior, see B.J. Biddle, Recent Developments in Role Theory, 12 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 67 (1986). 
58. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy 
20 (2007) (noting that constraints on presidential power “may . . . be sufficiently internalized so as 
to shape the types of goals that the president formulates in the first place”). Having become 
president or a Supreme Court justice, a person who aspired to one of those offices is likely to 
adopt an institutional perspective and sense of mission, involving the norms by which presidents 
and justices ought to behave within the framework of American law. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, 
The Court as an Idea, Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis 
of Supreme Court Decision-Making, in Supreme Court Decision-Making, supra note 16, at 65, 
74; Smith, supra note 16, at 94. 
I do not, of course, mean to imply that there will be perfect agreement about institutional 
roles. Nor do I mean to deny that those seeking or occupying roles at a particular time might 
believe that the powers currently associated with their offices should be either curbed or 
expanded. To take one recent example, some high-level officials in the Bush White House appear 
to have had the goal of restoring presidential powers that they thought had been wrongly 
diminished or had atrophied. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 5, at 58–61. But there is an important 
distinction between having a contestable conception of appropriate limits on institutional roles and 
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expectations in which judges and presidents function. Somewhat more 
specifically, the Constitution establishes a system of legal norms that (1) 
constitutes the United States and its government, (2) empowers government 
officials, (3) imposes duties on those officials, (4) establishes structural limits 
on the authority of particular institutions and officials, and (5) regulates 
officials’ discharge of their functions by creating substantive and procedural 
rights against them.
59 In order to talk meaningfully about constitutional 
constraints in this Article, I therefore use the word “constraint” in an enlarged 
sense. So used, it reflects the Constitution’s roles in supporting broadly shared 
understandings of lawful and unlawful official acts and, thus, in defining 
meaningful official goals. 
B. Constitutional Constraint and Constitutional Acceptance 
Although I have asserted that the Constitution constrains largely by 
constituting and empowering, I have not yet pressed the question how the 
Constitution acquires its capacity to constitute, empower, and constrain. The 
short answer is that the Constitution can achieve these effects because it is 
accepted as authoritative.
60 If we ask why the Constitution is law in the United 
States, but the decrees of the British Parliament and the Articles of 
Confederation no longer possess that status, the answer is that the former is 
accepted as law here and the latter are not.
61 As will soon become clear, 
however, the nature and extent of the Constitution’s acceptance require 
examination. For this purpose, I shall begin with the general jurisprudential 
account offered by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law,
62 but will adapt it to my 
inquiry into constitutional constraints within the American legal system. 
According to Hart, the “acceptance” necessary to sustain a legal system 
comes from governmental officials, especially judges.
63 More specifically, Hart 
posits that judges must adopt an “internal point of view” on the “rules of 
 
59. Cf. Ernest A. Young, The Constitutive and Entrenchment Functions of Constitutions: A 
Research Agenda, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 399, 400–01 (2008) (characterizing “the institution-
creating and rights-conferring functions” of constitutions as “to at least some extent flip-sides of 
another” and thus properly grouped under the heading of “the ‘constitutive’ function”). 
60. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional 
Norms, 17 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 45, 51–53 (1994) (arguing that the “ultimately validity” of 
the Constitution is “not itself a constitutional question, but a political and sociological one”). 
61. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of 
Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107, 1128–29 (2008). 
62. Hart, supra note 17. 
63. Id. at 256 (stating that “the rule of recognition . . . is in effect a form of judicial 
customary rule existing only if it is accepted and practised in the law-identifying and law-applying 
operations of the courts”); see also id. at 116 (asserting that the “rules of recognition specifying 
the criteria of legal validity and [the legal system’s] rules of change and adjudication must be 
effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials”). By 
contrast, Hart said, “[t]he ordinary citizen manifests his acceptance largely by acquiescence.” Id. 
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recognition” that establish the criteria for identifying valid and binding law
64: 
judges must regard the socially established and prevailing rules for identifying 
legal rights, powers, and obligations as “common standards of official behavior 
and appraise critically their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.”
65 For 
example, they must regard bills duly passed by both houses of Congress and 
signed by the president as law unless those bills run afoul of some applicable 
constitutional prohibition by, for example, discriminating on the basis of race 
or gender. 
In the United States, as in other legal systems, not all of the criteria for 
legal validity—especially those used by judges in legal interpretation—can be 
authoritatively written down. Any effort to list them definitively would lead to 
infinite regress: questions would endlessly arise concerning what rules to use in 
interpreting ostensibly ultimate interpretive rules.
66 In addition, it must be 
acknowledged that American constitutional practice is deeply argumentative,
67 
with Supreme Court justices notoriously disagreeing with each other in some 
cases about the criteria by which valid constitutional claims should be 
distinguished from invalid ones. In the well-known view of Ronald Dworkin, 
disagreement among judges and justices concerning the purported rules of 
recognition suffices to demonstrate that their conduct is not rule-governed at 
all.
68 
In my view, it is important to make neither too much nor too little of 
constitutional disagreement. Although some irreducible disagreement 
undoubtedly exists, there is also enough consensus so that issues of 
constitutional validity arise relatively rarely. No one doubts that most of the 
content of the statute books constitutes valid law. Even with respect to matters 
about which constitutional issues could obviously be raised, nearly all judges 
and justices frequently converge in their judgments, even if they disagree about 
why those judgments are correct. For example, some may think that the holding 
of Brown v. Board of Education
69 is valid law binding on the Supreme Court 
because it correctly reflects the original understanding of the Equal Protection 
Clause, and others because it is settled precedent, even if it does not correctly 
reflect the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment. For cases not 
resolved by consensus understandings, Jules Coleman has described the rule of 
recognition as a conventional “framework for bargaining.”
70 If Coleman is 
 
64. Id. at 116–17. 
65. Id. 
66. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment,  in  Antonin Scalia, A Matter of 
Interpretation 65, 77–78 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
67. See  Dworkin,  supra note 34, at 13 (“Legal practice, unlike many other social 
phenomena, is argumentative.”). 
68. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 39–45 (1977) (arguing that Hart’s 
account of the rule of recognition as the “master rule” of a legal system is untenable). 
69. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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correct, then in many of the disputed cases that come before the Supreme 
Court, the justices not only can, but sometimes must, base their decisions on 
controversial views concerning how pertinent authorities would best be 
interpreted, applied, or implemented.
71 
Although methodological disagreement in high-profile cases should not 
blind us to the phenomenon of widespread convergence in the vast, too often 
overlooked category of “easy” constitutional cases,
72 challenges such as 
Dworkin’s make clear that references to constitutional interpretation as 
governed by “rules” must employ that term in a distinctively capacious sense. 
For the Hartian idea of a “rule of recognition” to fit the American legal system, 
the concept of a rule needs to encompass not just rules as defined by 
Dworkin—rigid dictates that either apply or do not apply and tolerate no 
accommodation of competing considerations
73—but the whole range of 
sometimes inarticulate criteria employed in legal decision-making. Perhaps 
more broadly still, many of the pertinent rules of recognition may be “rules” 
only in the sense made famous by the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein: they 
mark a shared and often tacit understanding among some relevant group 
concerning how to “go on” in ways that will be acknowledged by others in the 
group as appropriate or correct.
74 According to an account of rule-following 
that Hart embraced,
75 “the test of whether a man’s actions are the application of 
a rule is not whether he can formulate it but whether it makes sense to 
distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things in connection with 
what he does.”
76 
When the term “rule” is used this loosely, there is undoubted and perhaps 
irreducible risk that it will be misunderstood. Perhaps it would be better to 
develop a richer and more precise vocabulary than Hart’s references to rules 
and a rule of recognition provide. Nevertheless, Hart seems to me to have been 
basically correct in suggesting that even the sharpest substantive and 
methodological disputes in constitutional law occur against the background of 
widely shared normative understandings, many of which are more tacit than 
express, and that the range of reasonable positions is bounded even in most 
cases of disagreement. 
 
71. See infra notes 135–137 and accompanying text. 
72. See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 408–14 (1985). 
73. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 68, at 24 (“Rules are applicable 
in an all-or-nothing fashion.”). 
74. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations para. 151–53, 179–83 
(G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 1953); see also  Coleman,  supra note 43, at 81 (invoking the 
Wittgensteinian notion to explicate jurisprudential issues). For explorations of Wittgenstein’s 
views about the nature of rule-following, see Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (Steven H. 
Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981); Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and 
Private Language: An Elementary Exposition (1982). 
75. See Hart, supra note 17, at 289. 
76. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 58 
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Applied to the Constitution of the United States, Hart’s framework 
implies that public officials and especially judges typically regard the 
Constitution and other, surrounding norms of legal validity as guides to their 
own conduct and as grounds for criticizing others. Both judges’ own accounts
77 
and psychological theories stressing the importance of socialization and social 
roles in influencing human behavior
78 attest to the plausibility of claims that 
judges seek to comply with distinctively legal obligations. Judges and justices 
are deeply socialized, beginning with their training as law students, to believe 
that there are legal norms independent of personal preference and that judges 
have an obligation to do what the law requires.
79 Indeed, legal norms may 
become so deeply internalized that the prospect of deviating from them would 
simply never enter a judge’s mind in many, perhaps even most, cases. For those 
who have internalized norms, those norms frequently determine behavior.
80 
According to Hart, ordinary citizens need not “accept” the “rules of 
recognition” by which binding law is identified in the same active sense as do 
judges; it suffices that ordinary citizens acquiesce to officials’ practices.
81 It is 
 
77. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420–21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(explaining that the Court’s decision, which held that a conviction for flag burning violated the 
First Amendment, “exacts its personal toll,” but that “sometimes we must make decisions we do 
not like,” because “they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution, as we see 
them, compel the result”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527  (1965) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that while the ban on contraceptives was “an uncommonly silly law,” the 
Court was “not asked . . . to say whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine,” but whether 
“it violates the United States Constitution”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel 
A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2006) (statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.) (“The 
judge’s only obligation—and it’s a solemn obligation—is to the rule of law. And what that means 
is that in every single case, the judge has to do what the law requires.”); Benjamin N. Cardozo, 
The Nature of the Judicial Process 114 (1921)  (describing the constraints on judicial 
creativity “established by the traditions of the centuries, by the example of other judges, . . . by the 
collective judgment of the profession, and by the duty of adherence to the pervading spirit of the 
law”); Henry J. Friendly, Judicial Control of Discretionary Administrative Action, 23 J. Legal 
Educ. 63, 64 (1970) (citing Lord Halsbury and Chief Justice Marshall for a view of law-bound 
discretion that “sounds remarkably like what judges do, or think they do”). 
78. For a survey of such theories, see Biddle, supra note 57. 
79. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 
B.U. L. Rev. 747, 751 (1992) (emphasizing “limits on what properly socialized judges do”); 
Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2113, 2132 (2007) (reviewing Brian Z. 
Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End (2006)) (“[T]he internalized sense of legal rule-
following by officials and the public . . . is part of what we call ‘the rule of law.’”). 
80. See, e.g., Christine Horne, The Internal Enforcement of Norms, 19 Eur. Soc. Rev. 335 
(2003); Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 591 (1996); 
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943 (1995); Richard A. 
Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1997, at 365, 
365 (explaining that judges follow “norms governing judicial behavior,” because failing to do so 
means “not playing the judicial ‘game,’” and the “judicial selection procedures select for persons 
who want to play the judicial game”); Symposium, The Legal Construction of Norms, 86 Va. L. 
Rev. 1577 (2000). 
81. See Hart, supra note 17, at 60–61 (considering the acquiescence of ordinary citizens 
as part of “the complex phenomenon which we call the existence of a legal system”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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possible, however, for ordinary citizens to accept the Constitution in a more 
active sense and to treat officials’ failures to observe constitutional norms as 
occasions for reproach. By all appearances, many citizens of the United States 
hold this normative attitude.
82 If many or even most citizens regard officials’ 
deviations from constitutional norms as deserving of rebuke, the practical 
implications can be enormous. 
In contrast with the “internal point of view” of those who regard the 
Constitution as furnishing reasons for action, Hart, as noted above, posited the 
existence of an “external” point of view.
83 For current purposes, it involves the 
perspective of someone who does not regard constitutional norms as inherently 
authoritative for her, but who wishes to understand and anticipate how others 
will identify and react to violations of the law.
84 So described, Hart’s external 
point of view approximates the attitude that some political scientists, 
employing a rational choice or game theoretical methodology, depict as 
underlying officials’ conformity to the Constitution.
85 
These positive theorists believe that what I characterized above as legal 
“norms” are in fact non-normative equilibria, reflecting rational calculations by 
a myriad of actors concerning how—in light of the expectations and likely 
reactions of others—it is in their rational self-interest to behave.
86 According to 
these theorists, the Constitution represents the solution to a coordination 
problem involving the interests of a multitude of actors:
87 “The Constitution of 
 
82. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 17 
(1984) (noting “the well-attested phenomenon of American constitution-worship”). 
83. Hart, supra note 17, at 88–89. 
84. Hart used the term “external point of view” in multiple senses: sometimes to refer to 
the outlook of someone concerned only with predicting behavior and wholly unconcerned with 
motivations, see id. at 86–89, sometimes to refer to the hermeneutic perspective of a person who 
grasps the rule an identifiable group applies but does not accept or endorse it, see id. at 89, and 
sometimes to describe the outlook of a Holmesian “bad man” who accords rules no normative 
significance but may nevertheless conform to them in order to avoid sanctions, see id. at 39. For a 
lucid brief discussion of Hart’s varying conceptions of the external point of view, see Shapiro, 
supra note 26, at 1159–61. The most crucial distinction between the internal and external points of 
view is that those who take the former view accept rules as reason-giving for them, whereas those 
who take the external point of view do not. 
85. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy 12–
18, 87–90, 97–98, 139–40 (1999) (describing the Constitution as a “self-enforcing” coordination 
convention); Peter C. Ordeshook, Constitutional Stability, 3 Const. Pol. Econ. 137 (1992); 
McNollgast, supra note 12, at 1668 (“[I]n our theory, doctrinal stability and the rule of law do not 
derive from first principles or the beliefs and values of judges but from the equilibrium between 
the political branches and the judiciary.”); Epstein, supra note 15, at 585 (“We argue that, given 
the institutional constraints imposed on the Court, the Justices cannot effectuate their own policy 
and institutional goals without taking account of the goals and likely actions of the members of the 
other branches.”). 
86. See Ordeshook, supra note 85, at 150 (“[I]f [a constitution] is effective—if it 
coordinates action—then it must be an equilibrium in the sense that no individual within the 
society has an incentive and the ability to defect to some other strategy.”). 
87. See  Hardin,  supra note 85, at 119;  Ordeshook,  supra note 85, at 149;  see also 
Holmes,  supra note 1, at 173 (“A liberal constitutional framework is a classic solution to a 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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1787 worked in the end because enough of the relevant people worked within 
its confines long enough to get it established in everyone’s expectations that 
there was no point in not working within its confines.”
88 As proponents of this 
mode of analysis emphasize, the observable results of self-interested action 
pursuant to a coordination convention (such as they take the Constitution to be) 
can be precisely the same as in the case of norm-guided behavior: “[S]ocially 
valuable goals, such as the respect for precedent and the rule of law, are a by-
product of the more narrow and limited goals [of judges and officials] of 
pursuing personal policy objectives”
89 subject to the constraints arising from 
the likely responses of others to some moves that they otherwise might make. 
Nonetheless, the underlying attitudes and motivations are strikingly 
different.
90 In the view of those who depict the Constitution as a coordination 
convention, one should be extremely skeptical of claims that anyone seeks to 
obey the Constitution out of a sense of obligation, rather than for wholly self-
interested reasons. One should also be alive to the possibility that officials or 
institutions, when it would advance their self-interest and when they can get 
away with doing so, might occasionally threaten or impose sanctions against 
those who comply with, rather than deviate from, constitutional standards. 
As I made clear in the Introduction, I believe that the internal point of 
view and the idea of normative constraints are absolutely indispensable to 
grasping how law in general, and how the American constitutional system in 
particular, function. Explanations of constitutional law as just a system of 
equilibria involving purely self-interested actors cannot account adequately for 
the law’s insistent claims to normative authority. As Hart emphasized, those 
who view law from an internal point of view express its demands in the 
language of obligation, including such terms as “ought,” “should,” “right,” and 
“wrong.”
91 Nor, as I have said, should the motivational efficacy of such claims 
and understandings be discounted.
92 
Plainly, however, normative constraints are not always efficacious, any 
more in law than in morals. (A constraint—including the paradigmatic threat of 
criminal punishment—can remain a constraint even if it fails to determine 
conduct in every instance.) In addition, reasonable disagreement can exist about 
the content of some of the norms by which officials are bound. As much as 
normative constraints, external constraints thus deserve attention in any study 
 
collective action problem.”). 
88. Russell Hardin, Why a Constitution?,  in  The Federalist Papers and the New 
Institutionalism 100, 117–18 (Bernard Grofman & Donald Wittman eds., 1989). 
89. McNollgast, supra note 12, at 1668. 
90. For discussion of the implications of judges’ holding these different perspectives, see 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Socio-Legal Methodology for the Internal/External Distinction: 
Jurisprudential Implications, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 1255 (2006). 
91. See Hart, supra note 17, at 57. 
92. For empirical research supporting the efficacy of internalized norms, see, for example, 
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of how our Constitution works in practice.
93 
 
II 
A TYPOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
This Part develops a typology of constitutional constraints—that is, a 
classificatory scheme for thinking about the ways in which the Constitution 
either constrains or establishes mechanisms for constraining government 
officials. Constraints on government officials count for my purposes as 
“constitutional constraints” as long as they are legal norms, or consequences 
arising from officials’ perceived violations of legal norms, that owe their 
existence to the Constitution’s constitutive effects. For example, sanctions for 
actual or purported constitutional violations are constitutional constraints as 
long as they are administered by constitutionally constituted entities, even if 
they are sanctions to which the Constitution makes no explicit reference. 
Although this usage is broad, it reflects my aspiration to address the questions 
of how and to what extent the Constitution constrains official decision-makers. 
A central way the Constitution constrains is by constituting or otherwise giving 
rise to institutions and legal practices that perform constraining functions.
94 
A. The Internal Point of View: Direct and Indirect Normative Constraints 
Insofar as officials regard the Constitution and its surrounding rules of 
recognition from an internal point of view, the Constitution constrains officials 
 
93. Bracketing as many issues as possible, I assume that normative constraints arising from 
perceptions of constitutional obligation function as constraints in ways analogous to those in 
which moral norms constrain those who accept them. For a brief but illuminating discussion, see 
Ferejohn, supra note 12, at 273–75; compare Biddle, supra note 57 (distinguishing norms, beliefs, 
and preferences as alternative explanations for conformity).  
94. Once it is recognized that a text can function as law only insofar as it is embedded in a 
practice that makes it law, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to give an informative account of 
what the Constitution is, and thus of how it constrains, without reference to the practice in which it 
is accepted, understood, and interpreted. In other words, references to “the Constitution” are 
almost inherently empty unless they signify “the written Constitution as identified and 
interpreted” under what H.L.A. Hart characterized as pertinent “rules of recognition”—and my 
references in this essay should be so understood. See Hart, supra note 17, at 116–17. Although 
my usage in this respect may appear to reflect an internal perspective on constitutional norms, 
those who claim that “the Constitution” is a coordination convention confront a similar challenge 
of specification to which they must respond in similar ways. If, as is undoubtedly the case, 
prevailing understandings of congressional, executive, and judicial power have shifted over time, 
the question arises whether we have had one coordination convention, or many. The best answer 
to that question, I think, is that the idea of the Constitution as a coordination convention must 
acknowledge that coordination can be reasonably successful even when it is less than complete 
and must presuppose criteria of identity that permit evolution or change. See generally Randall 
Calvert & James Johnson, Interpretation and Coordination in Constitutional Politics, in Lessons 
in Democracy 99, 104 (Ewa Hauser & Jacek Wasilewski eds., 1999) (advancing an approach that 
“sees a lasting constitution as an evolving convention, rather than a static one”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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by giving them duty-based reasons not to act in particular ways.
95 We can 
readily imagine, for example, that an official who would otherwise attempt to 
promote her party’s prospects of winning an election might regard herself as 
duty-bound to forbear from doing so in ways that would violate constitutional 
norms. As I noted above, the existence of constitutional norms depends on 
broadly shared, public understandings and practices. In a fundamental sense, 
public officials’ duties or obligations are therefore independent of what any 
particular official (possibly mistakenly) believes. In a functional sense, 
however, the Constitution’s capacity to constrain depends partly on the 
psychological apprehensions of legal duty that it generates. 
Within the category of normative constitutional constraints, a useful 
distinction exists between those that are direct  and those that are indirect. 
Direct normative constraints are reflected in an official’s unmediated, personal 
interpretation of the written Constitution or other sources of legal authority. 
They manifest themselves through what some scholars have termed a 
“Protestant” approach to constitutional law, in which each person decides for 
herself what the Constitution and other legal norms mean without 
acknowledging anyone else’s interpretations as epistemically authoritative.
96 
Indirect normative constraints exist insofar as officials are duty-bound to 
treat other officials’ interpretations or dictates as legally authoritative. It will be 
helpful to distinguish two subcategories of indirect constraints. First, insofar as 
the Constitution imposes an obligation on officials to accept someone else’s 
constitutional interpretations as binding, it subjects them to mediated 
constraints. Significantly, it is more the norm than the exception for officials to 
understand themselves as constrained to accept judicial, and especially 
Supreme Court, interpretations of the Constitution, even if they believe that the 
court has erred.
97 Some scholars have associated the acknowledgment of 
mediated constraints with a “Catholic” approach to constitutional 
interpretation.
98 
 
95. See Hart, supra note 17, at 11 (asserting that to “accept” a rule is to treat it as a 
“reason and justification” for action). 
96. See generally Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 9–53 (1988); Grey, supra 
note 82, at 3, 5–9. 
97. For a prominent defense of the idea that officials are bound by judicial interpretations 
of the Constitution even when they disagree with those interpretations, see Larry Alexander & 
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 
(1997) [hereinafter Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation]; see also Larry Alexander 
& Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 Const. Comment. 455 (2000) 
(responding to criticism of the idea that other officials must adhere to the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional rulings). For diverse opposing views, see, for example, Edwin Meese III, The Law 
of the Constitution, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 979 (1987); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This 
Time?, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1071 (1987); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: 
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L.J. 217, 343–45 (1994); Mark V. Tushnet, The 
Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 25–28 (1996). 
98. See Levinson, supra note 96, at 9–53; Grey, supra note 82, at 5–13. As I use the terms, 
the distinction between “direct” and “mediated” constitutional constraints is as much one of 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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The second subcategory of indirect constitutional constraints consists of 
constitutionally  authorized constraints, which result from the actions of 
governmental institutions in establishing valid law. The category of 
constitutionally authorized constraints is important insofar as officials, 
including judges and the president, are constitutionally obliged to enforce the 
law. 
It is tempting to conclude that the category of constitutionally authorized 
normative constraints subsumes, and thus renders redundant, the category of 
mediated normative constraints. For example, one might say that other officials 
are bound by Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution—and thus are 
subject to mediated constitutional constraints—insofar as the Constitution 
authorizes the Supreme Court to establish interpretations that bind other 
officials. For the moment, however, I prefer to leave open the question whether 
the Court should be viewed as authorized to bind other officials by 
promulgating erroneous interpretations, even if those erroneous interpretations 
subject other officials to mediated normative constraints. 
B. The External Point of View and External Constraints 
There are two main kinds of external constitutional constraints. One arises 
from recognition that some acts would fail to achieve their intended results 
because they would be regarded as legally inefficacious. Another constraint 
comes from the threat of sanctions that go beyond mere inefficacy or legal 
nullity. 
1. Inefficacy or Nullity Under Applicable Rules of Recognition 
Within Hart’s conceptual framework, many constitutional provisions are 
power-conferring rules
99 that enable officials to act with the authority of law. 
 
degree as it is of kind, for an official or institution can generate mediated obligations only insofar 
as it operates within its jurisdiction or is not ultra vires. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions about the constitutionality of school prayer can give rise to mediated obligations on the 
part of school officials, even if they believed that the Court erred, but a Supreme Court decision 
purporting to direct the Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates would not give rise to 
mediated obligations because it lies wholly beyond the Court’s jurisdiction. 
The related distinction between Catholic and Protestant interpretive approaches is similarly as 
much one of degree as of kind. Because of the need for those inclined to the Catholic view to 
make judgments about the scope of officials’ (and especially the Supreme Court’s) authority to 
decide authoritatively, the Catholic view necessarily shades into the Protestant view at the 
margins. Correspondingly, the Protestant view is an interpretive perspective on texts, practices, 
and other sources of legal authority that depend for their status as sources of legal authority on 
collective judgment and widespread practice. Thus, while the interpretive Protestant can maintain 
that the view of another official or institution is not necessarily authoritative with respect to any 
particular constitutional question, it is impossible to define an interpretive stance toward law that 
is wholly insensitive to the past and present views and actions of others. For a similar but not 
identical characterization of interpretive Protestantism in law, see Dworkin, supra note 34, at 
190, 413. 
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But constitutional grants of power are seldom absolute. More frequently, they 
specify the scope of an official’s jurisdiction to act authoritatively—that is, they 
authorize officials to perform some acts but not others. Power-conferring rules 
typically also prescribe the procedures officials must use in order to act with 
legal authority. 
Rules of recognition that mark the outer bounds of officials’ lawful 
authority function as external constraints on what those officials can do.
100 For 
example, members of Congress know that if they were to pass a bill forbidding 
any challenger from campaigning while Congress is in session, the enactment 
would be a legal nullity. Similarly, if we can imagine a president who 
otherwise might declare unilaterally that wealthy citizens must pay higher 
taxes, applicable rules of recognition would externally constrain the president 
from doing so. Absent the enactment of legislation, the president’s unilateral 
declaration would not be legally efficacious. 
One subset of constraints that arises from publicly recognized limits on 
official authority merits a brief, separate discussion: concurrent agreement or 
concurrent acquiescence requirements. The Constitution frequently constrains 
public officials by making their capacity to act authoritatively depend on the 
formally expressed concurrent agreement or acquiescence of other officials. 
Members of Congress cannot legislate without the agreement of a majority of 
other members of both the House and Senate, as well as that of the president.
101 
Presidents are constrained from filling high public offices, including 
judgeships, by the requirement that appointments receive the consent of the 
Senate.
102 
Although concurrent agreement requirements often have the principal 
purpose of promoting wise decisions, they can also help enforce constitutional 
norms.
103 Where concurrent agreement requirements apply, multiple parties or 
institutions have the authority to bar actions that they think the Constitution 
forbids. Either house of Congress can reject legislation on constitutional 
grounds; Presidents can veto bills that they believe to be unconstitutional. 
Perhaps more interestingly, both Congress and the President may view judicial 
review as a concurrent agreement or acquiescence constraint. 
 
100. See Kenneth Einar Himma, Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal 
Positivism, the Bill of Rights, and the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States, 4 
J.L. Soc’y 149, 154 (2003); see also Neal Devins, Should the Supreme Court Fear Congress?, 90 
Minn. L. Rev. 1337, 1341–42 (2006) (discussing effects of “implementation concerns” on 
Supreme Court decision-making); Friedman, supra note 10, at 295–308 (discussing the effect of 
the need to secure compliance from lower court judges on Supreme Court decision-making). 
101. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
102. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
103. For the argument that the Constitution aspires to protect rights by creating multiple 
institutions with the capacity to veto legislation that could reasonably be thought to violate rights, 
see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 
1693, 1706–07 (2008); Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 
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2. Sanctions 
The Constitution establishes a number of institutions with the capacity to 
impose formal sanctions such as criminal punishments, impeachments and 
removals from office, and dishonorable discharges from military service. In this 
Article, however, I use the term “sanctions” more broadly to embrace not only 
formally denominated penalties, but also any constitutionally authorized action 
by a constitutionally established institution that visits unpleasant consequences 
on another official or institution on the ground that he, she, or it has violated 
legal norms.
104 Like concurrent agreement requirements, sanctions can be 
authorized and administered either to promote wise policies or to enforce 
constitutional norms. 
An example of an informal sanction is an official’s constituents voting her 
out of office partly because they believe she has violated the Constitution.
105 
Just as the Constitution establishes formal institutions, notably courts, with the 
capacity to impose sanctions, it also constitutes the electorate as a political 
institution.
106 The political community and electoral constituencies that the 
Constitution establishes therefore count for some purposes as constitutionally 
empowered institutions capable of imposing sanctions.
107 
When the term “sanction” is used so broadly, the line between 
constitutional constraints arising from concurrent agreement requirements, on 
the one hand, and informal sanctions, on the other, is frequently uncertain. For 
example, a judicial opinion invalidating a statute or a presidential action on 
constitutional grounds might sometimes be plausibly assigned to either 
category—or to both. Most such rulings achieve their principal effect by 
relegating a purported assertion of governmental authority to the status of a 
legal nullity. But when, for example, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
Truman administration’s 1952 seizure of the nation’s steel mills,
108 its decision 
was widely construed as a rebuke by the Court that almost certainly weakened 
the administration’s political standing.
109 Occasionally, too, the Court writes 
 
104. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1523 (1984) 
(defining a sanction “as a detriment imposed for doing what is forbidden”). 
105. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard 
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 Geo. L.J. 1613, 1680 (2008) (“Voters may sanction a President whose 
constitutional readings the public finds distasteful.”). 
106. See id. (“Incumbent Presidents can lose reelection bids based on their constitutional 
readings—this arguably happened to John Adams because of his vigorous enforcement of the 
Sedition Act.”). 
107. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution, 2007 
Utah L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (emphasizing that the responsibility for enforcing the Constitution against 
the president ultimately resides with Congress and the electorate). 
108. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952). 
109. See David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 
Const. Comment. 155 (2002); see also  Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme 
Court 128 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that all the justices, most observers, and even President Truman 
agreed that the seizure of the steel mills was improper because “surely inherent executive power, 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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opinions that seem calculated to chastise and thus to sanction a lower court, the 
judges of which are likely to suffer a diminution in esteem within the legal 
profession, if not in the eyes of the broader public.
110 If Congress had approved 
President Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan in 1937,
111 its action would also have 
constituted an informal sanction. Congress would not only have rebuked the 
Supreme Court, but also visited upon the sitting justices an unwanted loss of 
power.
112 
The sometimes uncertain boundary between constraints arising from 
requirements of concurrent agreement and those arising from informal 
sanctions should occasion no alarm. Many robust distinctions have blurry 
borders: dusk and dawn do not seriously undermine the distinction between day 
and night.
113 More pertinently, by far the most important distinction in 
understanding constitutional constraints is the one between normative 
constraints operating through individual officials’ sense of duty, on the one 
hand, and external constraints enforced against individual officials by other 
officials or institutions, on the other hand. 
C. Constraint and Motivation 
Having now delineated some categories of constitutional constraints, I 
should like to make three further points about their relation to one another and 
their overall role in influencing officials’ behavior. 
First, constitutional constraints can sometimes be in tension with one 
another. Most obviously, disjunctions can develop between normative and 
external constraints. For example, the electorate might sanction a state court 
judge who is subject to reelection for fulfilling her normative obligations to 
enforce unpopular constitutional guarantees.
114 In thinking about constitutional 
 
even if there is such a thing, does not license the President to violate statutes”). 
110. An example is Vasquez v. Harris, 503 U.S. 1000, 1000 (1992), in which the Supreme 
Court vacated a stay of execution granted by the Ninth Circuit and further ordered summarily that 
“[n]o further stays of Robert Alton Harris’ execution shall be entered by the federal courts except 
upon order of this Court.” For discussion of the Harris case, see Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 155. See generally Stephen L. Wasby, Accountability: “Judicial Imperialism” 
Revisited, 65 Judicature 209, 217 (1981) (characterizing a higher court’s reversal of a lower 
court as a sanction). 
111. For a description of the Court-packing plan, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The 
Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt 84–
85, 96–97, 112–21, 142–43, 216–20 (1995). 
112. Cf. Posner, supra note 9, at 375 (observing that “[w]hat reins in the Justices . . . is an 
awareness, conscious or unconscious, that they cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting reprisals by 
other branches of government”). 
113. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 
593, 614 (1958) (explaining that “even if there are borderlines, there must first be lines”). 
114. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done 
Amid Efforts to Intimidate and Remove Judges From Office For Unpopular Decisions?, 72 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 308, 312 (1997) (warning that “[c]ourts are not independent when state judges are 
voted off the bench because of unpopular decisions by their courts and federal judges reverse 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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constraints, it is important to keep in mind that those imposing sanctions may 
not always apply the Constitution correctly and, in imaginable instances, might 
not even attempt to do so. 
Second, although normative and external constraints can be in tension 
with one another, I believe—and will suggest in subsequent Parts of this 
Article—that Supreme Court justices, in particular, rarely experience a sharp 
sense of conflict. Among the reasons, I would speculate, is that if external 
constraints make it impossible for officials to do efficaciously what they 
believe the Constitution requires them to do, they may tend psychologically to 
adjust their understanding of what the Constitution requires or permits.
115 
Suggestive in this respect is the observation, often given the status of a precept, 
that “the Constitution . . . is not a suicide pact.”
116 Also suggestive is the long 
tradition of prudential judicial decision-making, in which courts have typically 
avoided decisions that would provoke publicly approved defiance by the 
executive branch.
117 This tradition originated with Marbury v. Madison
118 and 
its companion case of Stuart v. Laird,
119 in which the Supreme Court—despite 
assertive talk in Marbury—yielded to political threats that included judicial 
impeachments by rendering judgments favorable to the Jefferson 
administration.
120 Judicial prudentialism may also help explain how, as Robert 
Dahl famously asserted, the Supreme Court has seldom departed very far for 
very long from the sentiments of aroused and durable political majorities.
121 
 
decisions or resign from the bench after a barrage of criticism”); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights 
and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1131, 1159 
(1999) (describing “the concern that elected judges, beholden to majoritarian support for their 
retention, will be reluctant to enforce unpopular rights,” and citing examples involving capital 
punishment and state constitutional welfare issues); cf.  The Federalist No. 78, at 470 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (cautioning that if judges are selected by “the 
people . . . there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity to justify a reliance that 
nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws”). 
115. Recent psychological research suggests that such corrective cognitive mechanisms 
affect adjudication. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 33, at 1100 (providing an account of “coherence-
based” reasoning, through which “cognitive mechanisms operate to create a lopsided view of the 
case that provides stronger argumentative support than the legal materials would otherwise 
provide”). 
116. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963). 
117. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial 
Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 16–20, 27–33 (2003) (describing a 
strand of prudentialism in Supreme Court decision-making that traces to Marbury). 
118. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
119. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
120. On the political maneuvering surrounding and reflected in Marbury and Stuart v. 
Laird,  see  Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, 
Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy (2005). 
121. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. Pub. L. 279, 285 (1957); see also Robert A. Dahl, Democracy 
and Its Critics 190 (1989) (“[T]he views of a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court are 
never out of line for very long with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the 
country.”); McCloskey, supra note 109, at 246 (“It is hard to find a single historical instance 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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If I am correct in my suggestion that officials will tend, when reasonably 
possible, to interpret their constitutional duties to avoid collisions with external 
constraints, then external constraints not only reinforce, but also help shape, 
officials’ perceptions of their obligations. What is more, insofar as officials’ 
perceptions of their duties are sufficiently widely shared to mark Hartian “rules 
of recognition,” then external constraints, by influencing officials’ beliefs, may 
actually play a role in defining officials’ normative obligations. If all or nearly 
all judges and justices follow rules of recognition under which they understand 
the Constitution as not requiring them to do what they are externally 
constrained from doing successfully, whether some or all of the time, then 
those rules will occupy the status of law by virtue of their acceptance.
122 
Third, because external constraints will frequently (although not 
invariably) align with normative constraints in either mandating or precluding 
the same official acts, mere observation of an official’s behavior will often not 
suffice to prove whether she acted out of a sense of normative obligation, on 
the one hand, or for instrumental reasons arising from external constraints, on 
the other. Although I am disposed to believe that many, if not most, officials 
respond to the pull of normative obligation most of the time, it seems to me a 
mistake—as I have suggested already—to insist on the categorical priority of 
one possible source of official motivation over the other. 
 
III 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON JUDGES AND JUSTICES 
This Part considers how the constraints identified in Part II apply 
specifically to judges and especially to justices of the Supreme Court. 
A. Normative Constraints 
As noted earlier, several types of evidence—including literature on norms, 
role theory, and socialization, as well as the personal testimony of judges and 
 
when the Court stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public demand.”); Steven 
G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57 Ala. L. 
Rev. 635, 687 (2006) (“We live in a nation where our Supreme Court follows the presidential and 
senatorial election returns and frequently overrules major precedents, invoking the constitutional 
text as its reason for doing so.”). But see Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political 
Court 113–19 (1999) (“[T]he value premises of a justice’s decisions can be and largely are 
consciously chosen by the elected representatives through the selection process.”); Segal & 
Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 14, at 424–28 (arguing that Supreme Court 
decisions generally correspond to public opinion, not because the justices take public opinion into 
account, but because public opinion influences who is nominated and confirmed to sit on the 
Court); Whittington, supra note 58, at 73 (“The Court need not regard itself as partisan [when 
its members have been appointed because their views accord with generally prevailing 
understandings], for the constitutional understandings shared by those affiliated with the regime 
will be entrenched and assumed.”). 
122. See Fallon, supra note 61, at 1140. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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justices
123—support the proposition that members of the judicial branch not 
only experience, but sometimes respond to, normative constitutional 
constraints. Although much might be said about the probative value of the 
various forms of evidence, it will be more fruitful to focus on the specific types 
of normative constitutional constraints plausibly applicable to judges and 
justices. 
1. Direct Normative Constraints 
Insofar as judges and justices take an internal point of view on legal 
norms, they are subject to direct normative constraints defined by the 
Constitution and by surrounding rules of recognition and adjudication (many of 
which are only tacit). Although the justices are the Constitution’s ultimate 
interpreters for some purposes, they have a duty to follow the law in 
discharging their functions. H.L.A. Hart described their role in terms that still 
ring largely true: 
At any given moment judges, even those of a supreme court, are parts 
of a system the rules of which are determinate enough at the centre to 
supply standards of correct judicial decision. These are regarded by the 
courts as something which they are not free to disregard in the exercise 
of the authority to make those decisions which cannot be challenged 
within the system . . . . The adherence of the judge is required to 
maintain the standards, but the judge does not make them.
124 
Although most lawyers and ordinary citizens seem likely to assume that 
judges and even Supreme Court justices are normatively constrained by legal 
rules, a number of political scientists have challenged that assumption. The 
most norm-skeptical of the political science accounts, the attitudinal model, 
postulates that Supreme Court justices consistently vote to decide cases in ways 
that directly reflect their ideological values.
125 As Jeffrey Segal and Harold 
Spaeth pithily summarize their causal theory, “[William] Rehnquist vote[d] the 
way he [did] because he [was] extremely conservative; [Thurgood] Marshall 
voted the way he did because he [was] extremely liberal.”
126 
Although the attitudinal model succeeds quite well in predicting the 
justices’ votes, the supporting studies do not seriously undermine the premise 
that judges and justices are normatively constrained by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States and that they behave accordingly much of the time.
127 
 
123. See supra notes 57–58, 77–78 and accompanying text. 
124.H a r t , supra note 17, at 145–46. 
125. See generally sources cited supra  note 14. According to Segal & Spaeth, 
Attitudinal Model, supra note 4, at 363, the impact of “internal and external non-attitudinal 
factors . . . appears to be minimal.” 
126. Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model, supra note 4, at 65. 
127. Here, a distinction that Judge Posner draws may be helpful: regardless of whether 
judges are psychologically, or unconsciously, motivated by ideology, the phenomenology of 
judging no doubt reveals that judges feel that they are normatively constrained by the 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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It is, for example, nearly impossible to imagine a justice who would not 
experience herself as normatively obliged to enforce the basic free speech 
rights even of speakers whose views she found politically misguided.
128 More 
generally, it is helpful in thinking about direct normative constraints on the 
justices to distinguish between the typically contentious cases that dominate the 
Supreme Court’s docket and the myriad “easy cases” that never come before 
any court because their legally correct outcomes would be so uncontestable.
129 
Unanimous opinions provide some evidence that justices of otherwise diverse 
ideological outlooks acknowledge the existence of rules capable of dictating 
legally correct outcomes—not chosen on the basis of ideological preferences—
when those rules clearly apply.
130 Although the outcomes in clear cases do not 
by themselves prove that the justices’ decisions result from a sense of 
normative obligation, rather than a response to external constraints, unanimous 
decisions at least signal the existence of rules of recognition that would 
generate a sense of obligation among those who take an internal point of view. 
A study by Thomas Keck more directly supports the suggestion that the 
justices normally adopt an internal point of view on constitutional norms.
131 
Based on an examination of the coalitions of justices that invalidated fifty-three 
federal laws between 1980 and 2004, Keck concludes that more than 70 percent 
had a bipartisan composition and that “more than [60 percent] . . . [were] 
inconsistent with a model of policy-motivated judging, either because they 
were joined by both liberal and conservative justices or because they reached 
results that are difficult to place in ideological space.”
132 
In citing evidence that the justices’ ideological preferences cannot always 
explain their voting, I do not mean to claim that such preferences never have 
significance. Not all constitutional disputes fall under clearly applicable rules. 
Indeed, in determining which cases to hear, the Supreme Court attaches a 
 
Constitution.  See  Posner,  supra note 9, at 40  (“Whereas psychology studies primarily the 
unconscious processes of the human mind, phenomenology studies first-person consciousness—
experience as it presents itself to the conscious mind.”). 
128. See id. at 45 (describing judges as having “internalize[d]” the “rules of the judicial 
‘game’”); Whittington, supra note 58, at 167 (“Judges are supposed to worry about the law, and 
the individuals selected to be judges are usually socialized into that role.”); Wendel, supra note 
55, at 1485. 
129. See Schauer, Easy Cases, supra note 72, at 408–14. 
130. From the Supreme Court’s 1994 term through its 2003 term, 35.5 percent of its 
decisions were by unanimous vote. See Nine Justices, Ten Years: A Statistical Retrospective, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 510, 520 tbl.IV (2004). 
131. Keck, supra note 40. 
132. Id. at 336; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the 
Rehnquist Court, 74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1043, 1045 (2006) (arguing that Rehnquist Court 
decisions involving Sixth Amendment rights to trial by jury in criminal cases, which often resulted 
from an alliance between liberal and originalist justices, “provide a concrete and important 
example of the power of law and legal methodology—and not simply politics—in Supreme Court 
decision making”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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priority to addressing issues that have divided lower courts
133—presumably 
because there is no clearly correct resolution on which all reasonable judges 
could be expected to concur. 
Even in the absence of agreement about how a case should be resolved 
under applicable rules, the possibility exists that justices who take an internal 
point of view on constitutional norms might perceive themselves as subject to a 
normative obligation to reach a uniquely correct result. For example, even if 
there is no widely shared substantive understanding of how to resolve many 
affirmative action and abortion cases correctly, it does not follow that the 
justices are at liberty to vote their ideological preferences with no further 
obligation of fidelity to law. In cases not clearly governed by a widely agreed 
upon rule or shared tacit understanding, H.L.A. Hart once spoke of judges 
having “discretion.”
134 In this context, however, the notion of discretion is not 
self-explanatory. In an early attack on Hart’s theory, Ronald Dworkin argued 
that judges deciding hard cases have a normative obligation to identify the 
result that best accords with the “principles” reflected in preexisting legal 
authorities.
135 In subsequent writings, even some legal positivists have agreed 
that the American legal system imposes a normative obligation on judges to 
decide otherwise contestable cases based on judgments concerning which 
outcome would be legally “best”
136—a formulation in near alignment with 
Dworkin’s theory of judges’ duties in hard cases.
137 
As suggested above, I believe that a judicial obligation to reach the legally 
best decision does indeed exist under the tacitly recognized rules of recognition 
of the American legal system and that Supreme Court justices recognize and try 
to satisfy that obligation, at least most of the time.
138 Considerations of moral 
or practical desirability may sometimes matter legally; the criteria of legality 
need not exclude normative attractiveness. Nevertheless, I think that the 
justices are directly normatively constrained to decide cases based only on 
 
133. See Sup. Ct. Rule 10 (explaining that the Court considers whether “a United States 
court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court 
of appeals on the same important matter” when deciding whether to grant certiorari); see also 
H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme 
Court 246–52 (1991) (noting that the Supreme Court often grants certiorari to resolve questions 
that have divided lower courts). 
134. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 17, at 127. 
135. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 68, at 24–45. 
136. See Himma, supra note 100, at  189–97 (2002) (asserting that the justices are 
practicing a recognition norm that requires the Court to ground its validity decisions in the best 
interpretation of the Constitution). 
137. See  Dworkin,  supra note 34, at 398 (asserting that “the American constitution 
consists in the best available interpretation of American constitutional text and practice as a 
whole” and maintaining that a judge’s “judgment about which interpretation is best is sensitive to 
the great complexity of political virtues bearing on that issue”). 
138. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 Mich. L. 
Rev. 621, 662 (1987) (“Judges conceive of themselves as constrained by the law even when no 
widely accepted social rule imposes such a constraint.”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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legally pertinent considerations, without regard to personal or partisan 
interests.
139 
Evidence that much of the public regards the justices as normatively 
constrained to do their conscientious best to identify legally best outcomes 
(without regard to extrinsic preferences) emerges from a prominent theme in 
the critical reaction to Bush v. Gore.
140 Pointing to some of the justices’ 
perceived deviations from their own interpretive philosophies,
141 many critics 
complained of betrayal.
142 Their protests reflected a deep belief that the justices 
have a constitutional obligation to strive to identify the outcome that would be 
legally best, rather than advancing their extralegal political preferences.
143 
If this view of the justices’ normative obligations is correct, it generates 
the initially counterintuitive conclusion—which Professor Dworkin has long 
pressed—that conscientious justices with partly divergent standards for 
identifying legally best outcomes in otherwise disputable cases can feel 
normatively constrained to reach divergent conclusions.
144 From reasonable 
and conscientious disagreement, one cannot infer the absence of normative 
constraint. In the primary, objective sense of that term, the justices may have a 
legal obligation to do what is legally best, even in the absence of shared 
substantive criteria for identifying what counts as best. And in the term’s 
phenomenological sense, some justices may apprehend a duty to uphold a claim 
of constitutional right (in an abortion or affirmative action case, for example), 
while other justices, who have different criteria for identifying what is best, 
 
139. See  Cardozo,  supra note 77, at 112 (observing that even when the law is 
indeterminate, and the judge must function as a legislator, “[t]here must be nothing” in the law or 
process of judicial decision “that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or 
fitfulness”). 
140. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
141. In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court’s most conservative justices, who are usually the 
least likely to uphold equal protection claims except in affirmative action cases—a potentially 
revealing signal in itself—all found merit in the equal protection argument asserted by the 
conservative Republican presidential nominee George W. Bush. Id. at 104–11. See Jack M. Balkin 
& Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1045, 1063 
(2001) (“The five conservatives were the least likely  .  .  . to extend the Warren Court’s equal 
protection doctrines in the area of voting rights.”). At the same time, the more liberal justices, who 
typically respond more receptively to equal protection claims, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, 
The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2007) (noting that liberal judges 
generally find themselves in “the more familiar position of pushing for an expansion of voting 
rights through equal protection,” while “conservative judges resist[] such expansion”), all 
dissented in whole or in part. Bush, 531 U.S. at 123–29 (Stevens, J. dissenting); id. at 129–35 
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 135–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 144–58 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
142. See, e.g.,  Vincent Bugliosi,  The Betrayal of America (2001); Alan M. 
Dershowitz, Supreme Injustice (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Unduly Partial: The Supreme Court 
and the Fourteenth Amendment in Bush v. Gore, 29 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 587 (2001). 
143. See, e.g., Balkin & Levinson, supra note 141, at 1064–65; Stephen M. Feldman, The 
Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the Internal and External Views of Supreme 
Court Decision Making, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 89, 111–12 (2005). 
144. See Dworkin, supra note 135, at 254–75, 410–13. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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may feel obliged to deny that same claim. 
Distinct from the question whether the justices are normatively 
constrained at all are issues involving the motivational force of normative 
constraints. In considering these issues, it may prove useful to distinguish 
between two kinds of cases. One involves a yielding to self-interest or personal 
preference—what we might think of as weakness of the will or, in a more 
sinister light, as official corruption. Among the reasons to want normative 
constraints enforced by external constraints is to diminish the risk of 
corruption. As I shall discuss below, it is usually taken for granted that external 
constraints are necessary to enforce nonjudicial officials’ adherence to law. I 
see no good reason to assume that Supreme Court justices, either, would always 
be wholly efficaciously motivated by purely normative constitutional 
constraints. 
The second, probably rarer question involving the strength of normative 
constitutional constraints arises when constitutional norms clash with moral 
norms. Among the difficulties in discussing collisions of legal and moral norms 
is that people will inevitably disagree about which cases present this problem. I 
shall therefore limit myself to possible examples. Several of the justices 
deciding Brown v. Board of Education
145 at least initially framed their choices 
as being between what was legally right, on the one hand, and what was 
morally right, on the other hand.
146 One could also imagine some of the justices 
in  Bush v. Gore thinking that extralegal policy concerns of supervening 
importance—possibly involving an impending constitutional crisis if 
uncertainty over the outcome of the 2000 presidential election persisted 
significantly longer—called for a conclusion dissonant with their conscientious 
legal judgment.
147 
In any case of collision between legal and moral norms, moral norms 
claim superior status.
148 Moral norms may of course accommodate legal norms 
to a considerable extent by requiring officials to obey even morally misguided 
laws, unless the laws are very seriously unjust.
149 But for an official who takes 
morality seriously, the question of the force of legal norms will always be a 
 
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
146. See Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court 
and the Struggle for Racial Equality 292–312 (2004). 
147. This is the way that I understand the argument of Richard A. Posner, Breaking the 
Deadlock (2001), though Posner himself seems to believe that his analysis shows the Court’s 
decision to have been legally correct. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 
118  Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1836–37 (2005)  (summarizing and characterizing Judge Posner’s 
argument). 
148. See, e.g., Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy 178 (1985) 
(explicating “morality” as a variety of ethical thought by noting that “moral obligation is 
categorical”). 
149. There is a vast literature on whether, and if so when, there is a moral obligation to 
obey the law. For an introduction, see William A. Edmundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey 
the Law, 10 Legal Theory 215 (2004). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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moral question. If we imagine Supreme Court justices as moral saints or heroes, 
the priority of moral norms over legal norms may provoke scant anxiety. We 
might think, for example, that even if Brown v. Board of Education was of 
doubtful correctness as a matter of law, the justices were right, morally 
speaking, to decide the case as they did and that the country is better as a result. 
Matters may look different, however, if we imagine the justices to be as prone 
to moral error as the ordinary lot of humanity.
150 Adopting that view, we might 
wish to enforce by external constraints the legal norms that apply to the 
justices.
151 
2. Mediated Normative Constraints 
Lower court judges are frequently subject to mediated constitutional 
constraints, reflecting their obligations to accept the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Constitution even when they believe the Court has erred.
152 
Judges who fail to respect this obligation often draw criticism for being 
lawless
153—a form of external constraint that I shall discuss below. 
Supreme Court justices, too, are subject to mediated normative 
constraints, including prior Court precedents. After discussing the role of 
precedent in Supreme Court decision-making, I shall briefly examine a few 
additional sources of mediated normative constraints on the Court. A review 
indicates that although mediated constraints seldom bind the justices 
categorically, such constraints exist, and the justices’ stance toward them helps 
 
150. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43 Am. J. Juris. 75, 88 
(1998) (arguing that we lack any “epistemic apparatus that would enable us to ground any but the 
most trivial and unhelpful inductions about expertise and institutional competence”); see also 
Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637 
(1998). 
151. See  Frederick F. Schauer,  Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical 
Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 158–66 (1991) 
(explaining the function of rules in allocating power). 
152. See, e.g., Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir. 
1980) (complying with a Supreme Court order to vacate a judgment despite believing that order to 
be “profoundly wrong” because “[s]ubordinate magistrates . . . must either obey the orders of 
higher authority or yield up their posts to those who will”); Hammond v. Bostic, 368 F. Supp. 732, 
736 (W.D.N.C. 1974) (reversing an earlier grant of a writ of habeas corpus in light of a 
supervening Supreme Court opinion, despite the judge’s admission that he “agree[d] thoroughly 
with the Supreme Court dissenters rather than with the majority”). For a prominent discussion of 
hierarchical precedent, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court 
Precedents?, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 817 (1994). 
153. A recent example involves Roy Moore, former chief justice of the Alabama Supreme 
Court, who was removed from office by a judicial ethics panel after he defied a federal court order 
to remove a monument of the Ten Commandments from the state judicial building. See Jeffrey 
Gettleman, Alabama Panel Ousts Judge Over Ten Commandments, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2003, at 
A16. In another example, several Ninth Circuit judges drew criticism for what seemed to many to 
be their refusal to follow Supreme Court precedent when they repeatedly granted stays as 
California attempted to execute Robert Alton Harris. See Caminker, supra note 152, at 819 & n.6 
(describing how “[m]any observers denounced the Ninth Circuit judges for defying the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncements”); Fried, supra note 110. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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illuminate their understandings of the Court’s role. 
a. Constraint by Precedent 
The mediated constraint that the justices most commonly acknowledge 
involves the doctrine of stare decisis.
154 Absent good reason not to do so, the 
justices consider themselves bound by previous Supreme Court decisions.
155 By 
the justices’ own account, the normative constraint arising from precedent is 
not absolute. The Court has said frequently that stare decisis is a principle of 
policy, not an inexorable constitutional command.
156 As I have noted, however, 
a constraint need not be absolute in order to count as a constraint. 
A more serious question about the normatively constraining effect of 
precedent comes from attitudinalist political scientists. According to them, 
precedent has little if any weight in the Supreme Court.
157 Indeed, Professors 
Segal and Spaeth have concluded that although the justices pay lip service to 
precedent, only rarely do they deviate from their revealed ideological 
preferences by acknowledging that a disputed case is controlled by a landmark 
precedent from which they dissented.
158 
Segal and Spaeth’s data prove less than the authors claim.
159 In thinking 
about the effects of precedent on the Supreme Court, I would begin not with the 
justices’ votes in disputed cases, but instead with the phenomenon that nearly 
everyone regards some constitutional issues that once provoked sharp debate as 
having been resolved conclusively by prior decisions.
160 For example, the 
 
154. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (describing how “the 
principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling [the rule established in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969)] now,” even if the Court would not agree with Miranda’s reasoning 
or holding in the first instance). 
155. See, e.g., id. (explaining that stare decisis “carries such persuasive force that we have 
always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification’” 
(quoting United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996)). 
156. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 63 (1996) (“[W]e always 
have treated stare decisis as a ‘principle of policy,’ (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 
119 (1940), and not as an ‘inexorable command,’ (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 
(1991).”). 
157. See Spaeth & Segal, Adherence to Precedent, supra note 14, at 287 (asserting 
that “precedent rarely influences United States Supreme Court justices”). 
158. See, e.g., Segal & Spaeth, Attitudinal Model Revisited, supra note 14, at 298–
310;  Spaeth & Segal,  Adherence to Precedent,  supra note 14, at  287–315;  see also 
Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. Legal 
Stud. 721, 739 (2000) (“Regardless of whether or not she was a member of the majority in the 
precedent, a justice would strongly tend to follow her decision rather than the precedent itself.”). 
159. Studies by other political scientists have suggested that precedent has a more 
significant effect than Segal and Spaeth allow, even in the disputed Supreme Court cases on which 
they focus. See Saul Brenner & Marc Stier, Retesting Segal & Spaeth’s Stare Decisis Model, 40 
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1036, 1043 (1996) (finding that in 47 percent of subsequent cases, “four center 
justices” included in the Segal and Spaeth study joined the main precedent-following opinion 
without attempting to distinguish or overrule it). 
160. See Mark A. Graber, Looking off the Ball: Constitutional Law and American Politics, 
(Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2007-24), available at 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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justices are unanimous in viewing precedent as establishing that paper money is 
constitutional;
161 that the Equal Protection Clause bars race-based 
discrimination in public schools
162 and imposes one-person, one-vote 
requirements;
163 that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the states;
164 that the federal 
government is bound by equal protection principles even though the Equal 
Protection Clause applies formally only to the states;
165 that the Constitution 
permits the vesting of broad regulatory and adjudicative powers in 
administrative agencies;
166 and that a multitude of important federal regulatory 
statutes, including the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
167 were validly enacted under the 
Commerce Clause. 
Although not all precedents bind absolutely, the nearly pervasive sense 
that past judicial decisions have conclusively resolved some issues helps 
confirm the existence of what I have referred to as “tacit” rules of constitutional 
adjudication.
168 A broadly shared understanding exists that a decision to 
overturn  some precedents—especially those the overruling of which would 
cause large practical dislocations—would exceed the outer limits of lawful 
judicial power, even if an otherwise attractive normative constitutional theory 
might mandate the overruling.
169 
If one assumes that the authority of at least some precedents reflects tacit 
and broadly shared understandings of what the law requires, disputes about 
whether the Court should overrule controversial decisions such as Roe v. 
 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006032. 
161. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 547 (1870), rev’g Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 
603 (1870). 
162. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
163. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
164. See, e.g., Duncan v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
165. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
166. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
167. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
168. See Fallon, supra note 61, at 1129–36. 
169. See id. at 1149 (arguing that precedents are invulnerable to overruling when they 
“have established a rule of law around which strongly held, settled expectations or reliance 
interests have developed” and “deal[] with matters that no longer occasion broad, ongoing, 
unstable contestation in American law and politics”). Such prominent originalists as Judge Robert 
Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia, who normally demand that judicial decisions reflect the original 
understanding of constitutional language, have thus said that they would make an exception for 
cases governed by deeply entrenched precedent. See  Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of 
America: The Political Seduction of the Law 155 (1991) (“Whatever might have been the 
proper ruling shortly after the Civil War, if a judge today were to decide that paper money is 
unconstitutional, we would think he ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk but by a 
guardian.”); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 
138–40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (characterizing respect for precedent as an exception to his 
originalist theory, not as an aspect of it); see also Jeffrey Toobin, The Nine: Inside the Secret 
World of the Supreme Court 103 (2007) (quoting Justice Scalia as comparing his own judicial 
philosophy with that of Justice Clarence Thomas by observing that “I am an originalist, but I am 
not a nut”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Wade
170 and about whether particular precedents control current cases (or are 
somehow distinguishable) are predictable examples of reasonable disagreement 
within our constitutional practice. They demonstrate only the limits, not the 
absence, of constraint by precedent—though, in gauging those limits, one 
should recognize that officials’ phenomenological sense of constraint may 
sometimes deviate from what “the law” would actually require. In other words, 
although officials’ psychological sense of constraint is important, particular 
officials’ beliefs about their obligations do not necessarily reflect what the 
Constitution in fact requires them to do.
171 
b. Additional Mediated Normative Constraints 
The Supreme Court regularly professes that it is subject to mediated 
constitutional constraints besides precedent, but, as a few examples will 
demonstrate, its position is wary and ambivalent. The Court may have good 
reason for refusing to formulate and adhere to clear, rule-like statements of the 
mediated normative constraints on its power to determine “what the law is.”
172 
The political question doctrine. The political question doctrine obliges the 
Supreme Court to treat other branches’ determinations of some constitutional 
questions as controlling.
173 In other words, determinations by the political 
branches in political question cases constrain the courts from reaching any 
other conclusion. Strikingly, however, although almost everyone acknowledges 
that there is a political question doctrine,
174 Supreme Court practice has left the 
doctrine so badly defined that no consensus exists as to what exactly the 
doctrine is or when it applies.
175 
Deferential standards of review. Some judicial doctrines call for courts, 
including the Supreme Court, to uphold the constitutionality of challenged 
legislation or executive action as long as it satisfies a minimal standard of 
reasonableness.
176 On one interpretation of such doctrines, the Court regards 
 
170. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
171. Cf. Simon, supra note 33, at 1129 (offering a cognitive psychological explanation of 
how Supreme Court justices on opposite sides of a disputable case can all believe that they are 
constrained by the law to arrive at the conclusions that they reach). 
172. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
173. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
174. But cf. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 Yale L.J. 597, 
622–23 (1976) (arguing that the so-called political question doctrine is “an unnecessary, deceptive 
packaging of several [independently] established doctrines” and has no further, legally valid 
scope). 
175. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart & Wechsler’s The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 244–67 (5th ed. 2003) (reviewing the range of positions taken 
in leading political question cases and the surrounding scholarly literature). 
176. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993) (affirming that 
statutes subject to rational basis review will be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state 
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U.S. 420, 425–46 (1961) (stating that “[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the 
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective” and 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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itself as normatively constrained to accept any reasonable judgment by the 
other branch about what the Constitution permits or requires.
177 On another 
interpretation, however, highly deferential doctrines do not assume the Court is 
bound by other branches’ determinations of constitutionality. They instead 
embody conclusions that the Court, typically for reasons involving institutional 
competence, should not enforce the Constitution to its “full conceptual 
limits.”
178 
Long unchallenged executive practice. The Supreme Court has sometimes 
said that long unchallenged executive practice, if acquiesced in by Congress, 
can constrain it from making rulings of unconstitutionality that it otherwise 
might make.
179 Significantly, however, the Court has carefully hedged its 
formulations to leave considerable uncertainty about when it will regard itself 
as bound in this way.
180 
Constitutional theories. Many normative constitutional theories call upon 
the justices to accept someone else’s understanding of what the Constitution 
means. Originalism would thus require the Court to regard the intent or 
understanding of the founding generation as controlling, even if the justices 
would otherwise understand their constitutional obligations differently.
181 
Common law theories call for judges to accord authority to prior judges’ and 
justices’ interpretations of constitutional language.
182 To give just one more 
example, James Bradley Thayer’s theory, under which the Court should uphold 
legislation unless it reflects a “clear mistake” about constitutional meaning, 
 
that “[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be 
conceived to justify it”); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1215 & n.6, 1234 & n.76 (1978) 
(citing  McGowan and explaining that “[u]nder the rational relationship test as it is normally 
applied, only an utterly bizarre and capricious state legislative act will be held unconstitutional”). 
177. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2817 n.27 (2008) (asserting 
that “‘rational basis’ is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance of the 
constitutional guarantee”). 
178. See Sager, supra note 176, at 1235; see also  Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in 
Plainclothes: A Theory of American Constitutional Practice (2004). 
179. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1371 (2008) (acknowledging that “if 
pervasive enough, a history of congressional acquiescence can be treated as ‘a gloss on “Executive 
Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II’”) (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 686 (1981)). 
180. Cf. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1370 (“[E]ven if we were persuaded that congressional 
acquiescence could support the President’s asserted authority to create domestic law pursuant to a 
non-self-executing treaty, such acquiescence does not exist here.”). 
181. See Bork, supra note 169, at 143–60 (arguing that “[w]hen a judge finds his principle 
in the Constitution as originally understood,” he is bound by that principle and “[h]e need not, and 
must not, make unguided value judgments of his own”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser 
Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849, 852 (1989) (distinguishing between opinions “rendered . . . on the 
basis of what the Constitution originally meant,” and those rendered “on the basis of what the 
judges currently thought it desirable for it to mean”). 
182. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 877, 883 (1996) (defending an approach to constitutional interpretation under which 
“[m]ostly the courts decide cases by looking to what the precedents say”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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would require the justices to extend authoritative status to the judgments of the 
legislature in nearly all cases.
183 
Constitutional theories hold endless interest for law professors. 
Interestingly, however, the justices themselves appear less preoccupied with 
constitutional theory as they go about their workaday business of resolving 
constitutional controversies. Although methodological disputes grow heated in 
some cases, it is striking that in the domain of constitutional adjudication, the 
justices have seldom exhibited much interest in attempting to bind either 
themselves or each other, in advance, to the kind of general interpretive 
approaches that academic theorists champion.
184 
If one asks why, two plausible explanations spring to mind. First, the 
justices might simply prefer to maximize the scope of their decision-making 
latitude.
185 But this explanation is not wholly satisfactory. If a majority of the 
justices shared an interpretive philosophy, they might actually maximize their 
power if they could bind other justices to adopt their methodology. 
Second, and more interestingly, the justices might believe that although 
they are bound by tacit norms of constitutional adjudication, their tacit 
knowledge defies accurate expression in propositional form.
186 Specifically, the 
justices might believe that although one or another constitutional theory comes 
closest to describing accurately the normative constraints to which they are 
subject, none does so perfectly, and that the tacit norms of constitutional 
adjudication thus actually constrain them from adopting any theory that might 
 
183. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893) (urging courts to invalidate statutes only 
when Congress has made a “very clear” mistake); see also Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under 
Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 270–76 (2006) 
(endorsing “a more specific interpretation or conception of” Thayer’s approach, under which 
“courts would be limited to enforcing, through judicial review, only clear and specific 
constitutional texts—the sort of texts that Marshall used as examples of judicial review in 
Marbury itself”). 
184. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 
1735–36 (1995) (arguing that judges in “well-functioning legal systems” frequently agree only on 
“the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it” without needing to “agree on 
fundamental principle” or “offer larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to decide 
the case”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the 
Supreme Court (1999). There are some who argue that, contrary to current practice, courts 
should give interpretive methodologies stare decisis effect in a way that would bind the justices to 
theory. See Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology, 96 Geo. L.J. 1863 (2008). 
185. See Mark V. Tushnet, The New Constitutional Order 140 (2003) (noting that 
the “minimalism” under which justices eschew general commitments maximizes their flexibility); 
Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone 
Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 769 (2008) (arguing that it is rational for judges to adjust their methods 
from case to case to reach appealing outcomes). 
186. Benjamin Cardozo thus spoke of judges as being subject to “restrictions not easy to 
define, but felt.” Cardozo, supra note 77, at 114. See generally Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of 
Mind 27–32 (1949) (emphasizing the importance of the distinction between “knowing how” and 
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diverge from those tacit norms in possibly unforeseeable future cases. For 
example, a justice might believe that tacit, governing norms require her to reach 
originalist decisions in some cases, to exercise Thayerian restraint in others, 
and to follow non-originalist precedent that is incompatible with Thayerian 
restraint in resolving other disputes. When the justices appear methodologically 
inconsistent, theorists object that the inconsistency shows intellectual 
bankruptcy and press the normative case for their preferred approaches with 
renewed urgency. It is possible, however, that many normative theorists have 
misapprehended the relationship between constitutional theory and 
constitutional practice. Whereas normative theorists often assume that an 
important role of theory is to improve constitutional practice, the justices may 
believe that constitutional theory could at most describe the tacit norms of 
existing practice and could have little or no authority to transform them. 
3. Constitutionally Authorized Normative Constraints 
As much as other officials, judges and justices are normatively 
constrained by validly enacted law, including statutes that regulate their 
jurisdictions.
187 Statutory constraints on judges and justices have enormous 
importance. It is nearly impossible to imagine a justice who would not feel 
constrained to enforce any law enacted by Congress, despite her personal 
disapproval of it, unless she had a good legal reason to hold it unconstitutional. 
A recent example comes from statutes specifying penalties for criminal 
offenses that some judges have regarded as draconian.
188 The justices appear 
 
187. Because Article III of the Constitution does not require Congress to create any lower 
federal courts at all, U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, lower federal courts possess jurisdiction only insofar 
as jurisdiction is conferred by statute. See Fallon et al., supra note 175, at 330–37. Although 
Article III expressly confers both original and appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme Court, the 
appellate jurisdiction is subject to “such Exceptions . . . as the Congress shall make.” U.S. Const. 
art. III, § 2, cl. 2. With Congress having regulated the Court’s appellate jurisdiction since the 1789 
Judiciary Act, the Court’s current appellate jurisdiction is almost entirely governed by statute. See 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1251–59 (2006). Although it is almost universally agreed that some possible 
statutory limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction would violate the Constitution, see Fallon et 
al., supra note 175, at 334–35, 337, the bounds on congressional power have seldom been tested 
and remain much debated. See id. at 337–42. 
188. A number of judges have criticized statutes that establish mandatory minimum 
sentences — including life sentences without the possibility for parole — for drug offenses. See, 
e.g., John Caher, Judge Gives ‘Small-Time’ Dealer ‘Unjust’ Mandatory Life,  Legal 
Intelligencer, Jan. 20, 2006, at 4. When Northern District of New York Judge David N. Hurd 
was forced under 21 U.S.C. § 846 to impose a life sentence on a “relatively small-time drug 
dealer,” he remarked: “The increment of harm in this case bears no rational relationship to the 
increment of punishment that I must impose. This is what occurs when Congress sets [a] 
mandatory minimum sentence which distorts the entire judicial process.” Id. (quoting Judge 
Hurd). In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005), the Court held that any factual 
predicate for the imposition of a sentence comes within the province of the constitutional right to 
trial by jury, but it did not question that Congress may prescribe mandatory penalties for crimes as 
statutorily defined, which the Court had earlier held constitutional in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79 (1986), and Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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never to have doubted that they and other judges must enforce all statutorily 
mandated penalties that are not substantively unconstitutional. 
To be sure, statutes often require interpretation, and the justices frequently 
divide along ideological lines in contested statutory cases (just as they do in 
constitutional disputes). Again, however, one should not view cases that 
provoke divisions as evidence of the absence of constraints. Judges and justices 
who take an internal point of view will experience themselves as normatively 
constrained to follow constitutionally valid statutes whenever they conclude 
(under accepted rules of statutory interpretation) that those statutes apply. 
B. External Constraints 
1. Inefficacy or Nullity Under Applicable Rules of Recognition 
Judges and justices are constrained by the prospect that some decisions 
they might imaginably render would be treated as nullities or otherwise prove 
inefficacious.
189 While some rules of recognition tell justices how to identify 
valid law, others, applicable to other officials, characteristically direct those 
other officials to accept judicial interpretations as binding—even when those 
other officials think the judges made mistakes.
190 But there are limits. For 
example, as I have said before, a judicial directive purporting to raise or lower 
interest rates solely for policy reasons would not be recognized as legally 
authoritative.
191 
This conclusion may appear trivial, but I do not believe that it is. As Fred 
Schauer has documented, the Supreme Court’s docket typically includes few of 
the issues that most American regard as most pressing.
192 Matters of war and 
peace, economic boom and bust, and priorities in the provision of public 
services seldom come within the province of judicial decision-making. In light 
of familiar assumptions that unchecked power tends to expand,
193 we might ask 
why this is so. Part of the answer lies in the justices’ awareness of external 
constraints. 
 
189. See, e.g., Himma, supra note 100, at 154; McNollgast, supra note 12, at 1641–47. 
190. See, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam) (“[U]nless we wish 
anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed 
by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to 
be.”); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) (explaining that “[n]o state legislator or 
executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to 
support it,” and that all officials are thereby bound by the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
interpretations); see also Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation, supra note 97, at 
1362 (offering an unqualified defense of Cooper “and its assertion of judicial primacy”). 
191. Cf. William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 Geo. L.J. 1807, 1862 (2008) (arguing 
that the judicial power to bind the president applies only when a court is acting within its 
jurisdiction). 
192. See Schauer, supra note 50. 
193. But cf. Levinson, supra note 46 (challenging the premise that government officials 
characteristically seek to expand the power of the institutions in which they serve). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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As a historical matter, the prospect of judicial pronouncements being 
treated as nullities or otherwise proving inefficacious is hardly hypothetical.
194 
President Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State James Madison credibly 
threatened to defy the Supreme Court if it awarded mandamus relief to William 
Marbury in Marbury v. Madison.
195 Abraham Lincoln directed his subordinates 
to ignore the ruling of Chief Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman.
196 
Another example may come from the World War II case of Ex parte 
Quirin,
197 in which the Court upheld executive authority to try alleged Nazi 
saboteurs before military tribunals rather than civilian courts.
198 While the case 
was pending, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made it known to the justices 
that if they ruled for the petitioners, he would order military trials and summary 
executions to proceed anyway.
199 In the wartime circumstances, military 
personnel would almost certainly have obeyed presidential orders to ignore a 
judicial ruling—a consideration that may well have affected the Court’s 
decision to uphold the constitutionality of military trials.
200 The Court may also 
have framed its famous order that local schools boards should enforce the rights 
recognized in Brown v. Board of Education
201 “with all deliberate speed,”
202 
rather than posthaste, partly because it knew that a mandate of immediate 
desegregation might have proved inefficacious.
203 
 
194. See Whittington, supra note 58, at 31–40 (summarizing well-known episodes of 
actual and threatened presidential defiance of judicial authority). 
195. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For a discussion of the political context surrounding 
Marbury and the possibility that the Supreme Court’s mandate would have been defied had the 
Court reached a different result, see Bruce A. Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding 
Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy 182–86 (2005); 
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the 
Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 16–20, 27–33 (2003) (describing Marbury as a 
prudent response to the nation’s political context and discussing the continuing existence of 
prudential decision making). 
196. 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). For a detailed analysis of the decision in Ex parte 
Merryman and its aftermath, see Daniel A. Farber, Lincoln’s Constitution 17, 157–63, 188–
95 (2003). 
197. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
198. Id. at 48. 
199. See Daniel J. Danelski, The Saboteur’s Case, 1996 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 61, 69. 
200. In what Justice Scalia has subsequently termed “not this Court’s finest hour,” Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting), the justices announced their ruling 
in Quirin almost immediately after the argument in the case, with the opinion explaining their 
reasoning issuing months later, after the petitioners had already been tried and executed by the 
military. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive 
Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 2029, 2078–79 (2007). 
201. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
202. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
203. See Klarman, supra note 146, at 312–20. In an example that is both more mundane 
and potentially more far-reaching, some political scientists believe that the Supreme Court 
frequently renders rulings that it regards as less than “ideal” in order to promulgate rules of 
decision by which it can expect lower courts and other official actors actually to abide. See 
McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 105, 112–19 
(2006). Because the Court can hear only a limited number of cases, it cannot effectively enforce 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Without attempting to account systematically for all possible external 
constraints that arise from the prospect that judicial rulings might be null under 
the rules of recognition practiced by nonjudicial officials, or might otherwise 
provoke defiance, I offer three observations. 
First, in cases in which the justices worry that executive officials or lower 
courts might defy their rulings, they may feel a tension between the direct 
normative constraints and the external constraints to which they are subject. In 
other words, they may believe that they have a legal duty to do what they may 
feel externally constrained from doing. In Quirin, for example, the justices 
might easily have believed that at least one of the alleged saboteurs—a U.S. 
citizen who had been apprehended within the United States—had a 
constitutional right to civilian trial.
204 
As I noted above, however, it also seems plausible that in a case such as 
Quirin, external constraints might affect the justices’ perceptions of their legal 
duties. For example, in reflecting upon precedents such as Marbury v. 
Madison
205 and Stuart v. Laird,
206 in which the Court bowed to political threats, 
the justices may have concluded that the “rule of recognition” authorizes them 
to avoid rulings that would likely provoke broadly supported defiance and 
thereby threaten the long- or short-term authority of the judicial branch. As I 
have written elsewhere: 
Looking at the Supreme Court’s long-term pattern of decisions, I 
would surmise that the Justices have internalized the constraint that the 
Court must conduct itself in ways that the public will accept as lawful 
and practically tolerable . . . : the Court’s interpretations of the 
Constitution must be likely to be accepted and enforced by at least a 
critical mass of the officials normally counted on to implement judicial 
decisions, and they should not trigger a strong and enduring sense of 
mass outrage by political majorities that the Court has overstepped its 
constitutional powers.
207 
 
doctrinal rules that the lower courts will not strive conscientiously to implement. See id. at 119; 
see also Friedman, supra note 10, at 295–308 (discussing the effect of the need to secure 
compliance from lower court judges on Supreme Court decision-making). Accordingly, these 
political scientists reason, the Court cannot achieve the results that it wishes unless it sufficiently 
accommodates the views of the lower federal judiciary to get them to play the role of faithful 
agents. See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, supra, at 112–19. In advancing 
this analysis, the authors who write jointly as McNollgast assume that judicial “[d]octrine emerges 
as part of the equilibrium interaction among the Supreme Court and the lower courts,” with no 
actor responding to normative constraints and “each acting to maximize its own preferences or 
ideology.” McNollgast, supra note 12, at 1646. Although I resist here as elsewhere the premise 
that all judges and justices behave in this way all of the time, I accept that some might do so at 
least some of the time and take seriously the suggestion that judges and justices may take note of, 
and sometimes respond to, external constraints on their de facto authority. 
204. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 200, at 2078–80. 
205. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
206. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 (1803). 
207. Fallon, supra note 61, at 1140. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
1018  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  97:975 
 Second, while assent to judicial mandates is today the norm, and official 
defiance of court rulings the exception, some observers believe that nonjudicial 
officials should feel freer than they presently do to treat judicial rulings as not 
binding on them. In a much discussed book, Larry Kramer has argued that 
nonjudicial officials once regarded themselves as being entitled as judges to 
interpret the Constitution, even after the courts had spoken, and to treat judicial 
rulings as limited to the particular cases in which they were issued or even to 
ignore them.
208 Whatever historical practice may have been, the recognition 
practices of nonjudicial officials could change in the future, with official 
defiance of judicial rulings becoming more common.
209 The external 
constraints on judges and justices are thus potential variables. 
Third, if we ask why elected officials, in particular, currently accede so 
readily to claims of judicial authority that are not clearly ultra vires, part of the 
answer can be traced to the external constraint that public expectations impose. 
The public expects governmental officials to obey the law, and the public has 
been socialized to believe that judicial interpretations are legally binding.
210 
But reference to current norms only postpones the question of how a state of 
affairs developed in which judicial authority to resolve disputable constitutional 
questions is so widely accepted. 
In addressing this question, it is just as important to recognize that the 
domain of recognized judicial authority is bounded—that there are some issues 
committed almost wholly to resolution by politically accountable officials—as 
it is to note that judicial authority is seldom seriously questioned within its 
sphere. In accounting for these phenomena, political scientists increasingly 
argue that the domain within which the Court possesses recognized authority is 
politically “constructed.”
211 With respect to the kinds of issues concerning 
which the courts speak authoritatively, elected officials prefer that the courts do 
speak authoritatively.
212 Maintenance of a relatively independent judiciary 
within a limited sphere may be the preferred strategy of risk-averse political 
leaders who willingly forego some opportunities to exercise power while they 
 
208. See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism 
and Judicial Review (2005). The book has attracted vigorous criticism. See, e.g., Larry 
Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1594 (2005) 
(book review). 
209. See generally  Whittington,  supra note 58 (exploring the historical conditions 
tending to support “judicial supremacy” in constitutional interpretation and emphasizing their 
contingency). 
210. See Fallon, supra note 107, at 23. 
211. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 58, at 4; Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial 
Review, 8 Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 425 (2005). 
212. See  Whittington,  supra note 58, at 25 (“As it has become evident that judicial 
supremacy is more often a help than a hindrance to political leaders, judicial supremacy has 
become more prominent and secure.”). See generally Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: 
The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004) (describing 
conditions under which vulnerable political elites in other nations have chosen to establish robust 
schemes of judicial review to protect the then-prevailing elite’s values). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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hold office in order to prevent unbounded power by their political adversaries 
when the adversaries triumph at the polls.
213 Perhaps of even greater 
significance, politicians may find it to their electoral advantage to leave a range 
of contentious issues for judicial resolution.
214 Congress and the president may 
also be happy to see dominant national visions enforced against the states
215 
and to delegate to the courts a number of issues possessing low political 
salience.
216 
If political scientists are correct that the domain of judicial authority is 
politically constructed, however, there is no guarantee that the political forces 
that define that domain will remain in long-term equilibrium. From the 
perspective of some political scientists, every election is a potential external 
shock to the system.
217 Keith Whittington advances the more architectonic 
thesis that, from time to time, “reconstructive” presidents have confronted the 
Supreme Court, sometimes successfully, and have forced a redefinition of the 
substantive bounds within which acceptable judicial decision-making can 
occur.
218 According to Professor Whittington, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt all achieved this effect to 
greater or lesser degrees.
219 They did so partly by persuading the public to 
accept their visions of constitutional meaning and partly, having prevailed in 
the court of public opinion, by appointing justices who shared their 
constitutional visions. Thus, to take the starkest example, the prevailing 
constitutional understandings that emerged from the Roosevelt Revolution of 
the 1930s—in the country as well as on the Court—differed vastly from those 
of the 1920s, and the principal engine driving the change was Franklin 
Roosevelt.
220 
 
213. See Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations 
of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. Legal Stud. 59 (2003). 
214. See, e.g.,  Whittington,  supra note 58, at 134–52; Mark Graber, The 
Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35, 38 
(1993) (“When disputes arise that most elected officials would rather not address publicly, 
Supreme Court justices may serve the interests of the political status quo by making policy 
favored by political elites.”); Keck, supra note 40, at 327–28 (noting that the Court decisions 
invalidating federal statutes on federalism grounds “allow Republican legislators to posture for 
their constituents by enacting popular civil rights statues  .  .  . while pursuing their broader 
ideological agenda of limited government through the courts”). 
215. Whittington, supra note 58, at 105–20. 
216. See id. at 120–24. 
217. See McNollgast, supra note 12, at 1655–56; see also Balkin & Levinson, supra note 
141, at 1102 (advancing a “theory of partisan entrenchment” under which “each party has the 
political ‘right’ to entrench its vision of the Constitution in the judiciary if it wins a sufficient 
number of elections”). 
218. See, e.g.,  Whittington,  supra note 58, at 22–23 (discussing the capacity of 
“reconstructive” presidents to construct “a new political regime” with altered “constitutional and 
ideological norms”). 
219. See id. at 31–40. 
220. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the 
Court, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 5, 120–28 (2001) (describing “the New Deal settlement” that replaced 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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In order for external constraints to be effective, judges and justices need 
not respond to them self-consciously, “for the constitutional understandings 
shared by those affiliated” with the dominant political coalition or “regime”—
including jurists who have been nominated and confirmed with their 
constitutional visions in mind—“will be entrenched and assumed.”
221 
Nevertheless, the external constraints that define the domain of politically 
acceptable judicial action can exert important influence as parts of the process 
through which current and future judges identify and internalize legal norms. 
As Thomas Keck puts it, “The justices’ ostensibly political preferences have 
themselves been constituted in part by legal ideas, and those legal ideas, in turn, 
have been derived in large part from ongoing debates in the broader political 
system.”
222 
2. Concurrent Agreement or Acquiescence Requirements 
The Supreme Court “is a they, not an it.”
223 In considering constraints on 
the Court as an institution, it is easy to forget that the Court is comprised of 
nine justices, each of whom is constrained individually by the need to secure 
the agreement of at least four colleagues in order to render legally efficacious 
constitutional rulings.
224 Judges of courts of appeals are similarly constrained 
by the need to muster majority support for their conclusions. Unlike Supreme 
Court justices, lower court judges are of course further constrained by the 
Supreme Court’s power to reverse their decisions.
225 
 
the previous prevailing constitutional assumptions). 
221. Whittington, supra note 58, at 73. 
222. Thomas M. Keck, The Most Activist Supreme Court in History: The Road to 
Modern Judicial Conservatism 277 (2004). 
223. Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the 
Fallacy of Division, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 549 (2005) (echoing Kenneth A. Schepsle, 
Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 239 (1992)). 
224. For an interesting discussion of the related issue of how the breadth and significance 
of judicial opinions tends to be influenced by the ideological cohesion of the justices forming the 
majority, see Nancy Staudt, Barry Friedman, & Lee Epstein, On the Role of Ideological 
Homogeneity in Generating Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 361 
(2008). 
225. Scholars have debated whether lower courts are bound to decide a case as they think 
that higher courts would on appeal, or whether they may offer independent judgments without 
attempting to emulate a superior court. Compare Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of 
Law, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 651, 655 (1995) (arguing that judges “generally ought not attempt to 
predict how other judges would rule” unless there are “special circumstances in which prediction 
is consistent with the rule of law”), with Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The 
Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1994) 
(suggesting that lower courts should attempt to predict and emulate the decisions of higher courts 
in cases in which the “inferior court confronts strongly probative predictive data concerning its 
superior court’s likely future ruling”), and Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the 
Court in Constitutional Law, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 357, 399 (1982) (arguing that greater uniformity will 
be achieved if lower courts attempt to imitate the Supreme Court). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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As I have noted, nonjudicial officials can defy or refuse to implement 
judicial decisions. Indeed, they have sometimes done so.
226 The courts, 
however, are virtually never constrained by the need to earn the formal 
approval or acquiescence of officials in another branch in order to act with the 
authority of law. The reason, I would speculate, is that the Constitution is 
written, and surrounding norms and expectations have developed, on the 
hypothesis that the judiciary is the least dangerous branch.
227 If the judiciary is 
assumed to be relatively impotent to inflict affirmative damage, and if the other 
branches are more threatening, it may be more desirable to preserve an 
efficacious checking power for the judiciary than to establish concurrent 
agreement or acquiescence requirements as formal checks against judicial 
action. 
Having said this, I hasten to add that there may be circumstances under 
which the exercise of a judicial negative does indeed do affirmative harm—for 
example, if the Court unwisely invalidates legislation that would further 
important public interests or protect moral rights.
228 Perceptions that the Court 
has done so partly explain some of the instances in which “reconstructive” 
presidents—including Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt—have 
mounted successful attacks on previously prevailing visions of appropriate 
judicial authority under the Constitution.
229 
3. Sanctions 
The Constitution insulates the Supreme Court, as it does all federal 
judges, against certain kinds of sanctions. The justices cannot be removed from 
office during good behavior, nor can Congress reduce their salaries.
230 All 
judges, justices included, also enjoy immunity from suits for civil damages 
based on their official acts.
231 
Despite these safeguards of judicial independence, the Constitution 
provides for some sanctions against Supreme Court justices. Most formally and 
conspicuously, justices can be impeached and removed from office.
232 They are 
 
226. See supra notes 194–203 and accompanying text. 
227. See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
228. See Fallon, supra note 103, at 1711 (noting the risk “that judicial review could 
sometimes frustrate legislative efforts to protect fundamental rights”). 
229. See generally  Whittington,  supra note 58, at 28–81 (discussing presidential 
challenges to judicial authority and successful efforts to reconstruct prevailing judicial regimes). 
230. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1. 
231. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (reiterating the well-established 
doctrine of judicial immunity, under which a judge is absolutely immune from suit so long as he 
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the challenged action and was performing a judicial 
act); see also Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (“[I]t is a general principle of the highest 
importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority 
vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal 
consequences to himself.”). 
232. U.S. Const. art. II, § 4; see also  The Federalist No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton) 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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also subject to the criminal law, including its prohibitions against bribery and 
extortion. 
Less formally, justices confront the possibility of sanctioning by their 
colleagues. If the justices thought one of their number to be reckless or cavalier 
in her constitutional judgments, they could deprive the wayward colleague of 
the privilege of speaking authoritatively for the Court simply by refusing to join 
her opinions. Or they could vote to rehear any case in which that colleague cast 
the decisive vote—as apparently happened with the aged William O. 
Douglas.
233 The justices’ capacity to write opinions exposing their colleagues’ 
constitutionally faithless reasoning (if such were ever to occur), and thus to 
hold up offenders to contempt or ridicule, may also qualify as a constitutionally 
authorized, albeit informal, sanction.
234 
Beyond the sanctions available against Supreme Court justices, the 
Constitution provides mechanisms for the imposition of institutional sanctions, 
directed not against individual justices but the Court as a whole. The 
Constitution permits Congress to withdraw at least some cases from the Court’s 
jurisdiction.
235 If so minded, Congress and the president could also “pack” the 
Court and thereby not only reduce the power of incumbent justices, but also 
diminish the Court’s prestige.
236 
Lower federal court judges are vulnerable to virtually the same sanctions 
as Supreme Court justices, but with one conspicuous addition. Unlike the 
justices, lower court judges are subject to being reversed, and potentially to 
being upbraided, on appeal.
237 
 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), at 453 (“There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of 
deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of 
the body intrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their 
presumption, by degrading them from their stations.”). 
233. See Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of 
the Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court 113 (1998). 
234. For this reason, some scholars have urged reform to the random selection of panels in 
the courts of appeals to ensure that no more than two judges on each panel are from the same 
political party. The minority member of each panel could then “blow the whistle on the majority’s 
unprincipled manipulation of doctrine (thereby enhancing exposure and the risk of a higher court 
reversal or perhaps damage to reputation of the panel majority).” Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. 
Cross, A Modest Proposal for Improving American Justice, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 215, 229 (1999). 
235. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
236. Over the course of American history, the number of seats on the Supreme Court has 
been as low as six and as high as ten. See Fallon et al., supra note 175, at 35 & n.43. The most 
notorious effort to pack the Court was Franklin Roosevelt’s ultimately unsuccessful threat to 
increase the size of the Court to avoid invalidation of New Deal legislation. See Leuchtenburg, 
supra note 111, at 84–85, 96–97, 112–21, 142–43, 216–20; Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The 
Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt’s Court-
Packing Plan, 12 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1992). 
237. See Posner, supra note 9, at 141 (treating the prospect of reversal as an “external 
constraint” on judges because reversal “can imply criticism rather than merely disagreement, and 
no one likes a public rebuke”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Insofar as threats of sanctions function as a constraint on judicial action, 
their directive force could sometimes create a tension with applicable 
normative constraints.
238 This prospect appears most visibly in the case of state 
judges, who may incur electoral or other political sanctions if their decisions 
displease a majority of voters.
239 But it is at least imaginable that an irate or 
partisan Congress might sanction federal judges by impeaching them and 
removing them from office for rendering unpopular but legally correct 
decisions.
240 
This possibility—which exemplifies the age-old dilemma of who should 
guard the guardians—is almost surely an unhappy one. But the threat has 
seldom if ever come to fruition. There are at least three lessons to be drawn. 
First, nonjudicial actors within the American political system, including 
the public, have largely internalized a norm against attempts to interfere with 
the exercise of independent judgment by the federal judiciary, and especially 
the Supreme Court. Early in American constitutional history, the Jeffersonian 
Republicans threatened to impeach judges as an instrument of ideological 
discipline, but the effort foundered before it gained momentum.
241 More than a 
century later, when Franklin Roosevelt sought authority to “pack” a Supreme 
Court that had appeared poised to scuttle hugely popular New Deal policies, 
Congress and public opinion rallied against the president.
242 Similarly, although 
members of Congress have recurrently introduced legislation that would curb 
the authority of the federal courts to rule on controversial issues,
243 such 
proposals have generally collapsed in the face of protests that they would 
violate the Constitution’s spirit if not its letter.
244 
 
238. See id. at 274. 
239. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
240. Although in principle, judges and justices could be impeached only for committing 
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors,” U.S. Const. art. II, § 4, whether a judge has been properly 
impeached is apparently a “political question” that is not judicially reviewable. See Nixon v. 
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993). Even recently, some members of Congress have 
threatened to impeach federal judges who render unpopular decisions. See Richard K. Neumann, 
Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const. L.Q. 161, 
163 (2007) (citing as one example the controversy surrounding Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube and 
threats of impeachment made by some legislators when judges refused to reinsert the tube). 
241. See  Ackerman,  supra note 195; Richard E. Ellis, The Jeffersonian Crisis: 
Courts and Politics in the Young Republic 69–82, 91–107 (1971) (describing the 
circumstances under which Jeffersonian Republicans in fact began impeachment proceedings 
against Federalist judges). 
242. See Leuchtenburg, supra note 111, at 92–93, 95, 152–54. 
243. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored 
Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16 Harv. C.R.–C.L. L. Rev. 129, 129 & n.1 (1981) (describing 
the “barrage of proposals to curtail the jurisdiction of the federal courts” on issues ranging from 
abortion to busing to prayer in public schools). 
244. See, e.g., Helen Norton, Reshaping Federal Jurisdiction: Congress’s Latest Challenge 
to Judicial Review, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1003, 1003–04, 1010, 1028–32 (2006) (noting that 
the Senate never voted on bills that would have eliminated federal jurisdiction over First 
Amendment challenges to recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance or over any question involving 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Second, as I have noted already, other powerful political actors have good 
reasons to wish to maintain a relatively powerful, relatively independent 
judiciary.
245 Granted, “reconstructive” presidents have sometimes sought to 
challenge the prevailing ideologically inflected assumptions through which the 
Constitution has predominantly come to be viewed. But even reconstructive 
presidents and their normal allies have either had normative compunctions 
about subjecting the Supreme Court to significant sanctions or have 
encountered external resistance when they attempted to do so. 
Third, saying that the sanctioning of federal judges and especially the 
Supreme Court has occurred infrequently is different from saying that the 
prospect of sanctions has had no effect. As I have noted, judicial decision- 
making in the United States has long exhibited a streak of prudentialism, 
through which the Court has avoided not only particular decisions that might 
provoke defiance, but also broader patterns of rulings that could arouse political 
majorities to impose sanctions.
246 Although I would stop considerably short of 
Judge Richard Posner’s conclusion that “[c]onstitutional law is a function . . . 
of ideology” checked principally if not exclusively by the justices’ “awareness, 
conscious or unconscious, that they cannot go ‘too far’ without inviting 
reprisals by the other branches of government spurred on by an indignant 
public,”
247 it seems only commonsensical to assume that sanctions or other 
external constraints have some effect. 
IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON NONJUDICIAL OFFICIALS 
In formal terms, nonjudicial officials—including presidents and members 
of Congress—are subject to the same varieties of internal and external 
constraint as Supreme Court justices. In substantive respects, the operative 
constraints differ markedly. 
A. The Internal Point of View: Normative Constraints 
1. Direct Normative Constraints 
Although we may tend to equate the Constitution with the judicially 
enforced Constitution, to do so is a mistake. Nonjudicial officials are subject to 
a variety of direct normative constraints: in numerous contexts they are obliged 
to do what the Constitution directly and substantively requires of them, wholly 
independently of anything courts might say. 
 
the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act). 
245. See supra notes 211–216 and accompanying text. 
246. See Fallon, supra note 195, at 16–20, 27–33. 
247. See Posner, supra note 9, at 375. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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To begin with, it is widely presumed that members of Congress are 
normatively obliged not to vote for,
248 and that presidents are similarly 
normatively constrained not to sign into law,
249 legislation that they believe to 
be unconstitutional, even if they think a court might uphold it. Among other 
things, as Larry Sager has long maintained, some judicial doctrines may 
underenforce the constitutional guarantees on which they rest, perhaps most 
frequently because of practical and prudential considerations.
250 The bite of the 
underenforcement thesis resides in the claim that even when constitutional 
guarantees are judicially underenforced, their normative content should bind 
nonjudicial officials.
251 
Beyond appraising the constitutionality of legislation, executive officials 
and legislators must determine how the Constitution bears on some of their 
most basic obligations of office. Among the cases in which legislators and 
executive officials must construe the Constitution are those presenting political 
questions.
252 Beyond the formally denominated political question doctrine, 
members of Congress must decide how, if at all, the Constitution speaks to 
issues involving the proper use of their powers to trade votes, demand special 
favors for constituents as a condition of support for legislation, engage in 
filibusters, and withhold their consent from presidential nominations. Similarly, 
presidents must decide what count as constitutionally appropriate criteria on 
which to nominate candidates to constitutional office, including the federal 
judiciary. Presidents also have broad discretion to define their obligation to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
253 
On matters of greater topical interest, presidents and those advising them 
must also make numerous determinations of constitutional legality concerning 
 
248. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2243 (2008) (“The usual presumption 
is that Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of office, considered the constitutional 
issue and determined the amended statute to be a lawful one  .  .  .  .”); id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“We have frequently stated that we owe great deference to Congress’s view that a law 
it has passed is constitutional.”); U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 (1990). 
249. Saikrishna Prakash, Why the President Must Veto Unconstitutional Bills, 16 Wm. & 
Mary Bill Rts. J. 81, 82 (2007). 
250. See Sager, supra note 176, at 1212–13; see also Sager, supra note 178, at 6–7. 
251. See Sager, supra note 176, at 1263–64. I have registered a partial disagreement on the 
ground that if, as Sager argues, “institutional factors” can sometimes excuse the courts from 
enforcing constitutional norms to their full conceptual limits, other “institutional” considerations 
might similarly justify Congress and the executive in allowing “underenforcement” to occur. See 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1275, 1323–27 (2006). 
252. On the political question doctrine, see generally Fallon et al., supra note 175, at 
244–67. 
253. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3; see, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) 
(reiterating that the decision of a prosecutor to indict “has long been regarded as the special 
province of the Executive Branch,” free from judicial control); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna 
B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L.J. 541, 582–84 (1994) 
(reading the Take Care Clause to bolster the unitary executive argument that “the President 
possesses unique powers with respect to the execution of the law”). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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matters—some but not all related to national security—that are unlikely ever to 
come before a court and on which there are no close judicial precedents. As I 
have noted, the historical record suggests that some officials take their 
constitutional obligations very seriously in such cases.
254 It also bears noting 
that the Constitution’s import in many national security cases has occasioned 
dispute and, significantly, that many critics accuse executive officials of having 
breached important normative obligations.
255 
In characterizing nonjudicial officials who regard the Constitution from an 
internal point of view as subject to direct normative constraints, I make no 
specific claim about those constraints’ substantive content or their motivational 
efficacy. Bypassing those issues, I offer three further comments. 
First, as my reference to national security matters may have suggested, 
executive officials—like Supreme Court justices—can reasonably disagree, and 
sometimes be mistaken, about what their constitutional powers and obligations 
are.
256 Moreover, in determining what the Constitution permits or requires, 
executive officials—again like Supreme Court justices—sometimes may need 
to make contestable judgments of what would be legally “best.” From the 
absence of agreement among executive officials, one should not infer the 
absence of normative constraint, either in the objective or the subjective sense. 
Second, the institutional environment in which officials function may 
influence their psychological apprehensions of the normative constraints to 
which they are subject.
257 For example, insofar as ideologically like-minded 
people deliberate in private about what the Constitution requires or permits, 
recent psychological studies suggest that their interactions may tend to push 
them to more extreme positions than most or even any would have held 
initially.
258 To say that officials experience normative constraints and 
obligations is thus not to say that their constitutional judgments are wholly 
disinterested, rather than partly ideologically driven. This is one reason to 
believe that some, if not all, normative constraints on nonjudicial officials 
should be enforced by external constraints. 
Third, I believe that elected officials, especially the president, would view 
themselves as normatively empowered and constrained to treat ultra vires 
judicial rulings—such as orders to the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates or 
 
254. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
255. For opinionated surveys of the leading debates, see, for example, Goldsmith, supra 
note 5; Mayer, supra note 5; Yoo, supra note 5. 
256. See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 129 (observing that he “grudgingly admired” 
the “perverse integrity” of an administration official who believed in nearly unlimited executive 
power “even when I thought his judgments were crazy”). 
257. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for 
Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence, 52 McGill L.J. 1, 33–35 
(2007) (tracing psychological factors that tend to promote conformity of behavior to group norms 
and expectations). 
258. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
Yale L.J. 71, 118–19 (2000). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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to military officials to pursue different tactics in battle—as lacking the 
authority of law.
259 Just as some normative constraints on nonjudicial officials 
are and should be buttressed by external constraints, the Supreme Court’s sense 
of normative constraint does not and should not furnish the only constitutional 
safeguard against government by judiciary. 
2. Mediated Normative Constraints 
Most officials understand themselves as normatively constrained by 
judicial interpretations of the Constitution very much, if not all, of the time, 
even when they disagree vehemently with court rulings. Questions involving 
nonjudicial officials’ legal and moral obligations to act in accordance with 
judicial decisions are surprisingly diverse. Some are very difficult.
260 Nearly 
everyone agrees that officials should regard themselves as normatively bound 
by judicial determinations in cases to which they are parties, at least outside the 
scope of patently ultra vires rulings.
261 By contrast, it is commonly believed 
that presidents and members of Congress are respectively entitled to veto or to 
vote against legislation that they think unconstitutional even if the courts would 
disagree.
262 
Perhaps the most actively debated question involves the extent to which a 
judicial ruling in one case should bind officials who were not parties to the 
action. The leading case is Cooper v. Aaron,
263 in which a unanimous Supreme 
Court asserted a general obligation of government officials—whether or not 
they were named parties to lawsuits—to implement constitutional principles as 
the Court articulates them.
264 
Although there is much to be said both for and against the position that the 
Court staked out in Cooper,
265 the principal point that I want to make, as 
 
259. See Baude, supra note 191, at 1862 (arguing that officials have no obligation to obey 
judicial orders that exceed the scope of judicial jurisdiction). 
260. For leading discussions on this topic, see sources cited supra note 97. 
261. See Fallon, supra note 107, at 1 & n.1. The one prominent dissenter from the 
consensus view is Michael Paulsen, who argues instead that the president may refuse to follow the 
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the law, and that “he may exercise such powers of legal review 
even in the specific case where courts have ruled against his position; that is, he may refuse to 
execute (or, where directed specifically to him, refuse to obey) judicial decrees that he concludes 
are contrary to law.” Paulsen, supra note 97, at 222. 
262. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1267, 1309–10 (1996); Rex E. Lee, The Provinces 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 1009, 1012 (1987). 
263. 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). 
264. Id. at 18; see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974). 
265. At least two rationales might support the Cooper approach. According to Professors 
Alexander and Schauer, a fundamental goal of the Constitution is to achieve authoritative 
resolution of issues about which reasonable people can differ; and authoritative resolution is 
possible, they say, only if other officials swiftly accept Supreme Court decisions as binding. See 
Alexander & Schauer, Extrajudicial Interpretation,  supra note 97, at 1371–81.  Another 
supporting argument would attempt to build on general jurisprudential claims, most prominently 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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throughout this article, is more analytical than normative: the question of an 
official’s normative obligation to obey a judicial decision must always and 
inevitably be refracted through that official’s mind and conscience. Although it 
is certainly possible to take a “Catholic” position with respect to matters of 
constitutional obligation, believing oneself bound by what others have 
determined, even the most deferential Catholic must decide for herself that she 
ought to be a Catholic—or an adherent to Cooper v. Aaron—rather than an 
interpretive Protestant.
266 Today, most officials and citizens appear to regard 
themselves as normatively bound to obey and enforce broad judicial 
pronouncements rendered in cases to which they were not parties. But we can 
never know for certain that a Protestant revolution is not in the offing, or would 
not be provoked by some imaginable courses of decision making by the 
Supreme Court.
267 As I suggested earlier, the justices may well bear this 
consideration in mind when deciding controversial cases. 
3. Constitutionally Authorized Normative Constraints 
Constitutionally valid federal legislation subjects the president and the 
executive branch to a myriad of indirect, constitutionally authorized 
constraints. Many federal statutes either mandate or forbid executive action. 
Even when legislation applies in terms only to private conduct, the president 
has a constitutional obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.
268 
 
offered by Joseph Raz, that root legitimate legal authority in epistemic competence. See Joseph 
Raz,  The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 1003 
(2006); see also Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1986). According to Raz, morally 
conscientious citizens should accept the dictates of legal authorities when they have good reason 
to believe that the legal authorities can make better decisions than they could make themselves. 
See  Raz,  supra, at 1018–20. Similarly, a defense of Cooper  might assert that courts, and 
especially the Supreme Court, have a special competence in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., 
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics 25 (1962) (defending judicial review on the premise that “courts have certain capacities 
for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not possess”). If so, 
perhaps other officials should understand themselves as constitutionally obliged to accept the 
Court’s pronouncements, due to the likelihood that the Court’s determinations are correct. 
In my judgment, neither of these arguments proves wholly convincing. As I have meant to 
emphasize, the Constitution is not just a document for judges; it could not function effectively if it 
were. To get disputed questions settled authoritatively is one reason to have a constitution, but not 
the only reason. Especially with respect to disputable matters, judicial decisions should not too 
quickly foreclose democratic debate. Recognition that some matters of constitutional 
interpretation are reasonably disputable also undermines arguments that rely on strong 
assumptions about the superior epistemic competence of courts. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of 
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006).  
266. On the distinction between Catholic and Protestant approaches to constitutional 
interpretation, see supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
267. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 58, at 27 (“We can easily imagine presidents 
dismissing the authority of the Court and ignoring its opinions . . . . We can easily imagine a Court 
reduced to political subservience . . . .”). 
268. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Because Congress is the lawmaking branch, it may be subject to fewer 
indirect, constitutionally authorized constraints than either the president or the 
judiciary. But one can imagine members of Congress feeling indirectly 
normatively constrained by the constitutionally authorized actions of past 
Congresses, even if the pertinent normative obligations are not judicially 
enforceable. Examples might include normative obligations to fund payments 
of the national debt and to pay veterans’ benefits. Although the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity would likely bar judicial enforcement of any promise by 
the government to pay money if the government chose to renounce its 
obligations,
269 conscientious members of Congress well might view themselves 
as indirectly normatively constrained by the actions of predecessor Congresses. 
Treaties may also impose indirect normative constraints on presidents and 
Congress to take steps necessary to satisfy the nation’s promises.
270 
B. The External Point of View and External Constraints 
1. Inefficacy or Nullity Under Applicable Rules of Recognition 
As I have noted, officials would never seriously contemplate many actions 
because they know that those actions would be null or inefficacious. If 
purported “official” actions were sufficiently clearly ultra vires, judicial rulings 
to that effect would not be necessary. 
In other cases, officials must contemplate the possibility that actions that 
would not otherwise be obviously unconstitutional would be treated as null or 
inefficacious under past judicial decisions. For example, police officers know 
that evidence procured in contravention of judicial interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment will prove legally ineffective for its intended purpose,
271 as will 
confessions elicited without Miranda warnings.
272 Some actions might also 
lead to sanctions—a further external constraint that I discuss below. 
Matters are too complex, however, to permit simple summary. Some 
official actions that deviate from judicial pronouncements do not prove 
inefficacious. Officials in some communities defied the ruling of Brown v. 
 
269. See  Fallon et al.,  supra note 175, at 938–72 (discussing federal sovereign 
immunity). 
270. Although it appears settled that treaties calling for the expenditure of funds require 
implementing legislation, see Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the 
question whether Congress has a duty to appropriate money is distinct, and was actually a subject 
of congressional debate in connection with the 1794 Jay Treaty with Great Britain. See David P. 
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801, at 211–17 
(1997). 
271. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule, 
which prevents the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, is enforceable against the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
272. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476–77 (1966) (providing that statements 
given absent Miranda warnings will be inadmissible against a criminal defendant). 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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Board of Education
273 for a decade or more.
274 Even today, public school 
officials in some parts of the country apparently assemble their students to 
pray,
275 despite Supreme Court decisions holding such conduct 
unconstitutional.
276 Thus, the extent to which executive and legislative actions 
that defy judicial pronouncements will be regarded as null or otherwise prove 
ineffectual is as much an empirical-sociological question as it is a legal one.
277 
2. Concurrent Agreement or Acquiescence Requirements 
An important subcategory of nullity or inefficacy constraints arises from 
concurrent agreement requirements: nonjudicial officials are frequently 
constrained from acting efficaciously unless they can procure the concurrent 
agreement or acquiescence of other officials. Indeed, as I emphasized above, 
judicial review of legislation embodies a kind of concurrent agreement or 
acquiescence requirement. 
The demand that Congress and the president receive the concurrent 
agreement or acquiescence of the courts in order to act with legal authority, 
whereas the Supreme Court seldom needs the concurrent agreement of another 
branch in order to make legally binding rulings, reflects a notable asymmetry in 
the distribution of constitutional powers. The best explanation is not that the 
Constitution encourages government by judiciary. It is, rather, that the 
Constitution assumes that executive and legislative power, if not subject to 
concurrent agreement and acquiescence requirements, would be more 
dangerous than assertions of legitimate judicial power. By design, the 
Constitution makes governmental action—and especially lawmaking—
difficult, and establishes inaction as the preferred default position.
278 As I have 
noted before, judicial power is typically power to nullify or veto, not to issue 
 
273. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
274. See Klarman, supra note 146, at 397–421. 
275. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 1087, 1109 (2008) (citing evidence of “widespread defiance” of the Supreme 
Court’s school prayer decisions). 
276. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225–27 (1963) (holding 
unconstitutional mandatory Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 
(1962) (holding that it violates the Establishment Clause for school officials to initiate school 
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277. See generally  Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring 
About Social Change? (1991) (arguing that a number of celebrated Supreme Court decisions 
proved largely ineffectual as engines of social change); Louis Fisher, Constitutional 
Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 221–29 (1988) (identifying factors that can 
lead to noncompliance with Court decisions). 
278. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 Colum. L. 
Rev. 673, 707–10 (1997) (describing how protections built into the lawmaking process “raise the 
decision costs associated with lawmaking, safeguarding liberty through a deliberate sacrifice of 
governmental efficiency” because the Framers “saw the risks of ill-advised governmental action 
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affirmative mandates. 
To be sure, conspicuous exceptions to this generalization exist, especially 
with the advent of “public rights” litigation in which single lawsuits determine 
the rights of many claimants and sometimes produce decrees ordering large 
changes in governmental operations.
279 Brown v. Board of Education
280 and the 
one-person, one-vote cases
281 provide telling examples. Nevertheless, judicial 
decisions that broadly alter settled understandings of rights and responsibilities 
remain more the exception than the norm. The recurring impulse to distinguish 
negative from positive rights,
282 and to restrict the courts to enforcing the 
latter,
283 may testify to the endurance of the intuition that courts need not be 
subject to the same kinds of concurrent agreement and acquiescence 
requirements as the political branches because judicial power is less sweeping 
and affirmative, and thus less dangerous, than executive and legislative power. 
3. Sanctions 
Nonjudicial officials, especially in the executive branch, are commonly 
subject to a range of potential sanctions that includes, but is not limited to, 
criminal punishments, civil damages, and injunctive remedies.
284 The 
legislative branch possesses authority to investigate and expose alleged 
misconduct by executive officials,
285 with the resulting loss of reputation 
 
279. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1281, 1289–92, 1294–96 (1976) (distinguishing public law or public rights litigation from 
traditional litigation); William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies 
and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 Yale L.J. 635, 638–41 (1982). 
280. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
281. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 573, 624–25 (1964). 
282. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 
2271 (1990); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
864, 864–67 (1986). 
283. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Commentary: The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights 
in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695, 696 (urging against recognition or judicial 
enforcement of welfare rights under the Constitution because “the end result would be to convert 
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Against Positive Rights, in Western Rights? Post-Communist Application 225–32 (András 
Sajó ed., 1996) (claiming that it is “a large mistake, possibly a disaster” to include positive rights 
in constitutions in countries transitioning from communism to a market economy). But see Mark 
Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1895, 1919 
(2004) (arguing that “[t]he experience of constitutional courts around the world suggests that 
scholars of U.S. constitutional law would do well to rethink the conventional wisdom about the 
inclusion of social welfare rights in judicially enforceable constitutions”). 
284. See generally Fallon et al., supra note 175, at 938–1141 (surveying jurisdictional 
and related doctrines applicable to legal actions against the government and government officials); 
Peter H. Schuck, Suing Government: Citizen Remedies for Official Wrongs 29–53 
(1983). For a historical discussion of evolving patterns of civil remedies against government 
officials and the contours of official immunity, see Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official 
Immunity and Accountability, 37 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 396, 397–400 (1987). 
285. Congress also wields the power of impeachment. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. 
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potentially rising to the level of an informal sanction. In addition, both the 
voters and higher-level executive officials can often, although not always, 
impose the informal but de facto sanction of removal from or non-retention in 
office. 
Although not all sanctions against the executive branch are judicial 
sanctions, nearly everyone seems to assume that judicial sanctions are vital to 
enforcing executive officials’ mediated normative obligations to obey judicial 
interpretations of constitutional norms. Many observers thus regard suits for 
damages and the exclusionary rule (which might plausibly be classified as a 
sanction, rather than a concurrent agreement requirement, in cases in which the 
underlying norm is well established) as necessary tools for achieving police 
compliance with constitutional norms bearing on criminal investigations.
286 In a 
historical study, Michael Klarman identifies the general absence of sanctions 
against law enforcement officials and jury commissioners as a central reason 
that Supreme Court decisions establishing rights of racial equality went widely 
unenforced in the South before the 1960s.
287 
In order for an action to incur sanctions, its occurrence must of course be 
known. From this commonplace observation flows an implication of large 
importance: officials of the executive branch are likely to be less externally 
constrained by the threat of sanctions when they are able to act in secret than 
when their conduct is known or likely to become known to the broader public. 
Scandals involving abuse of prisoners in the so-called “War on Terror” 
are revealing in this respect: officials who have wanted to pursue 
interrogational and other information-gathering tactics of doubtful legality have 
understood that their capacity to do so depends on their ability to keep their 
actions secret, often even from others within the executive branch.
288 I use the 
term “doubtful legality” advisedly, for it appears that many high-level officials 
have sincerely believed that the Constitution vests the president with national 
security powers that trump otherwise applicable legal principles.
289 In their 
view, any sanctions applied against officials who do what they reasonably think 
needs to be done to protect national security would reflect constitutional 
misjudgments by the sanctioning agents.
290 
 
286. See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment 
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Movement 223–24 (2007). 
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Yoo, supra note 5, at 102–04, 113–14, 168–87. 
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Members of the legislative branch are subject to fewer judicial sanctions 
than are members of the executive. Legislative officials enjoy absolute 
immunity from damages liability for their legislative acts.
291 Injunctions against 
legislative action are of uncertain constitutional validity.
292 The best 
explanation for the disparity in the availability of judicial sanctions probably 
involves the capacity of executive officials to practice direct coercion—
something that legislators ordinarily cannot do. 
Comparison of executive officials with judges might appear to cast doubt 
on this suggestion; judges enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for 
actions—including coercive actions—taken in a judicial capacity.
293 If one asks 
why damages remedies are widely assumed vital in ensuring executive, but not 
judicial, adherence to law,
294 the answer may be that the legal process affords 
safeguards against abuse that are frequently lacking in the case of executive 
action. Among other considerations, judicial action is almost always public, not 
secret. Consequently, it may not occasion the special need for deterrence that 
exists in contexts in which executive officials hope to hide their coercive 
actions but know that they may not succeed in doing so. Another, possibly 
related, reason might be that the judges who have crafted immunity doctrines 
regard their fellow members of the judicial branch as more likely than 
executive officials to obey the law in the absence of threats of sanctions.
295 
 
cannot explore here, about the normative and external constraints to which the press is and ought 
to be subject. For a critical discussion of recent conduct by the press in exposing operations that 
compromised intelligence-gathering activities, see Jack Goldsmith, Secrecy and Safety, 239 New 
Republic 31 (2008). 
291. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 623–25 (1972) (interpreting the Speech and 
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see also Schuck,  supra note 284, at 90 (summarizing the Court’s justifications for absolute 
judicial immunity). 
295. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 528 n.* (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“If one were to hazard an informed guess as to why such a distinction in 
treatment between judges and prosecutors, on the one hand, and other public officials on the other, 
obtains, mine would be that those who decide the common law know through personal experience 
the sort of pressures that might exist for such decision makers in the absence of absolute 
immunity, but may not know or may have forgotten that similar pressures exist in the case of 
nonjudicial public officials to whom difficult decisions are committed. But the cynical among us 
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Without going into detail, I offer just one further comment: however vital 
sanctions may be in constraining official action, especially by the executive 
branch, there can be no guarantee that sanctioning authorities will administer 
sanctions appropriately—a point that I have made previously, but one worth 
repeating. In a vivid illustration, some official courses of action or inaction 
might actually trigger rival sanctions. For example, even after the time finally 
came when southern officials might have incurred sanctions from the courts for 
not implementing the mandate of Brown v. Board of Education, those officials 
might nevertheless have provoked sanctions from the voters if they had 
acquiesced without resistance.
296 Or an executive branch official might be 
sanctioned by superiors for what the superiors regard as dereliction of duty 
unless the lower-ranking official takes actions that courts would punish in a 
case before them. In an analogous if not identical situation, some officials of 
the Bush administration lost their jobs when they resisted assertions by other, 
higher-level officials that the executive branch was largely unconstrained by 
law in seeking to combat international terrorism.
297 
When elected officials would risk sanctions if they followed courses of 
action that they feel normatively constrained to pursue, it is tempting to 
conclude that normative constraints should always prevail. In considering the 
practical implications of this suggestion, however, one should recall that all 
purely normative constraints necessarily operate through each official’s 
individual mind and conscience. Inevitably, some officials will acknowledge no 
mediated normative obligation to adhere to judicial decisions that they regard 
as erroneous. And of those who insist on interpreting the Constitution for 
themselves, some may have eccentric or even dangerously roguish 
understandings. 
An alternative prescription would be that officials should always regard 
their mediated normative obligations arising from judicial interpretations of the 
Constitution as determining what they ought to do.
298 Regardless of the wisdom 
of this suggestion, it seems plain that officials do not always follow it. 
Moreover, it might well be intolerable if judges and justices ceased to be 
constrained at all by the threat that some imaginable judicial decrees would be 
treated as nullities. 
At the end of the day, perhaps no more can be said than this: sanctions are 
an important mechanism of constitutional enforcement; they are sometimes 
more and sometimes less effective; and they will occasionally be employed 
misguidedly. In all cases, however, sanctioning officials and institutions—as 
much as the targets of sanctions—function within a network of empowerments 
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and constraints in which none is wholly unconstrained. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have sought first to unpack or make intelligible, and then 
to provide a framework for answering, the questions whether, how, and to what 
extent the Constitution constrains government officials. Answers must begin 
with the proposition that constitutional constraint and empowerment are two 
sides of the same coin. The Constitution constrains most fundamentally by 
constituting a matrix of institutions and offices in which the powers of any one 
are defined and limited by the understandings, expectations, and powers of 
others. To be a president or a Supreme Court justice is to have some lawful 
powers but not others. Constraint inheres not just in threats of sanctions, but 
also in the incapacity to act with recognized authority beyond the sphere of 
tenable claims of lawful power, and in norms that define official roles and 
obligations. 
In considering the nature and extent of constitutional constraints on the 
Supreme Court, in particular, most of us tend to focus too readily on the 
domain in which the justices seem least constrained—in determining whether 
the actions of other institutions of government are constitutionally valid or not. 
In asking only whether and how the Supreme Court is constrained in 
adjudicating the constitutionality of abortion restrictions or affirmative action, 
for example, we risk misunderstanding not only how constrained the justices 
are from asserting power over other matters, but also how it is that the 
Constitution constrains the justices, as well as other officials, most 
fundamentally. 
Within the network of roles and institutions that the Constitution 
constitutes, officials, including justices, are subject to constraints of two basic 
kinds. First, officials who accept the Constitution’s authority—as most 
presumably do—will experience themselves as subject to normative 
constraints. They will regard the Constitution as providing them and others 
with reasons to take some actions and forego others. They will view deviations 
from constitutional norms as grounds for criticism and self-criticism. But not 
all of the normative constraints that the Constitution establishes are of the same 
type. Direct normative constraints, which reflect the Constitution’s mandates 
under accepted rules of recognition, need to be distinguished from mediated 
normative constraints, which apply when the Constitution requires one 
institution or official to accept another institution’s or official’s interpretations 
as binding. 
In one sense, normative constitutional constraint is a matter of law, 
independent of what any particular official believes the law to be. To be 
normatively constrained by the Constitution is simply to acknowledge a duty to 
do what the Constitution requires. As a practical matter, however, normative 
constraints are necessarily refracted through the minds of particular officials. In 1 FALLON.FINAL.DOC 8/17/2009  10:30 AM 
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another sense, direct normative constraints are, thus, the perceptions of 
constitutional obligation experienced by particular officials even when they 
disagree with one another about what the Constitution requires and even when 
at least one must be in error. When the term “direct normative constraint” is 
used in this second sense, some justices or other officials may feel constrained 
to uphold a claim of constitutional right, while others feel constrained to reject 
it. Absence of agreement does not imply an absence of felt constitutional 
constraint—even if one believes that it would be preferable for the Constitution 
to constrain more determinately or unmistakably than it does. 
The possibility of dispute about constitutional meaning, or about the 
constraints that the Constitution directly imposes, helps explain why mediated 
constitutional constraints play such an important role in our constitutional 
scheme. Under currently prevailing understandings, nonjudicial officials are 
frequently constrained not by the Constitution’s substantive demands as they 
would correctly be understood, or as each official personally understands them, 
but by the interpretations propounded by the judicial branch. Within bounds—
but only within bounds, as I have tried to show—“the Constitution is what the 
judges say it is.”
299 
The second main variety of constitutional constraints, which I have called 
external constraints, arises not from officials’ conscientious commitment to 
obeying the Constitution, but from social facts involving other officials’ and the 
general public’s understandings of the limits of lawful official conduct. 
Officials know that if they violate widely recognized boundaries on their 
authority, their assertions of power would prove inefficacious, and in some 
cases could incur sanctions. The prospect of inefficacy and the threat of 
sanctions function as significant external constraints on official action. 
In maintaining that public officials can be motivated by both normative 
and external constraints, I have scrupulously tried not to claim a categorical 
priority for one or the other. Although I find it hard to believe that the 
Constitution could function effectively without inspiring a motivationally 
efficacious sense of obligation in at least some officials, neither could I imagine 
a workable legal regime without external constraints on official action. For the 
most part, moreover, observable patterns of official compliance with law tend 
to be equally consistent with the competing hypotheses that officials act from a 
sense of constitutional obligation and that they adapt their self-interested 
behavior to external constraints. 
In a few cases, the normative and external constraints may diverge. For 
example, high-level officials in the executive branch could sanction 
subordinates for refusing to breach constitutional norms in attempting to 
eradicate national security threats, or the voters could sanction a state court 
judge for upholding unpopular but valid constitutional claims. For the most 
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part, however, external constraints tend to reinforce normative constraints on 
official action. And in a few instances, I have speculated, external constraints 
may actually help to shape prevailing understandings of what the Constitution 
normatively permits or requires. Similarly to the way in which “ought implies 
can” in the realm of morals,
300 we may tend to assume in law that Supreme 
Court justices, in particular, have no constitutional obligation to attempt to do 
what—because of external constraints—they could not do efficaciously. For 
example, I would argue that under prevailing rules of recognition, the justices 
are not always duty-bound to enunciate constitutional principles that, in a 
particular historical epoch, would prove too publicly and politically 
unacceptable to be enforced effectively. 
Among the external constraints that officials must observe in order to act 
efficaciously, concurrent agreement or acquiescence requirements possess an 
importance that bears separate mention. Members of Congress and often the 
executive branch, including the president, cannot act with the authority of law 
unless they can procure the concurrent agreement or acquiescence of other 
officials. Members of Congress cannot legislate without the concurrent 
agreement of a majority of their colleagues; the president often requires 
congressional authorization; and otherwise efficacious official acts will be 
viewed as null unless the courts concur in judging them constitutionally valid. 
Because the courts, unlike Congress and the president, typically do not 
require the concurrence or acquiescence of other branches in order to act with 
legal authority, the judicial branch can appear to be peculiarly, even 
dangerously, unconstrained. But the suggestion that we have an unconstrained 
judiciary does not withstand analysis. Examined as a whole, the Constitution 
embodies a premise—whether correct or incorrect—that governmental action is 
presumptively more dangerous than governmental inaction and should, 
accordingly, be subject to more veto opportunities. Because the judiciary 
controls neither the sword nor the purse, its principal power is to nullify 
attempted action by officials of other branches, not to implement policy 
initiatives of its own. In this sense, the judiciary remains the least dangerous 
branch, even if its powers to constrain the other branches have increased 
dramatically over the arc of constitutional history. Those who view the modern 
judiciary as relatively unconstrained have misunderstood the ways in which the 
Constitution constrains most effectively and fundamentally. 
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